# **ASRS Database Report Set**

# **Controller Reports**

Report Set Description	. A sampling of reports from Air Traffic Controllers.
Update Number	2.0
Date of Update	July 27, 2000
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	50
Type of Records in Report Set	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

AFS:262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de-identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director Aviation Safety Reporting System

#### CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences. We have no way of knowing which.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, distort ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area "A" than area "B" simply because the airmen who operate in area "A" are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

Only one thing can be known for sure from ASRS statistics—they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 300 reports of track deviations in 1993 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with certainty that at least 300 such events have occurred in 1993.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

For text on the strengths and limitations of incident data, the process of using incidents for human factors evaluations, statistical analysis methods and other sources of incident data, see:

Chappell, S.L. (1994). Using voluntary incident reports for human factors evaluations. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald & R. Fuller (Eds.), Aviation Psychology in Practice. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

#### **Time**

Date : 199903 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

State Reference: IN

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 18000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 19000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZAU.ARTCC

Make Model: Fighting Falcon F16

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 431900

### Person / 2

Function.Controller: Radar

#### Person / 3

Function.Controller: Radar

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Instruction : Instructor

#### Person / 5

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Airspace Violation: Entry Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 2

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

### Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

OLK (WOLF LAKE) RADAR CTLR WAS WORKING BUSY TFC WITH AN UNQUALIFIED D-SIDE. A 'STING' FLT OF F16'S LEFT FWA APCH CLBING TO FL180 ENRTE TO HILLTOP MOA. THE 'STING' RTE OF FLT TRAVERSED BEARZ SECTOR ARR CORRIDOR WITHOUT A POINTOUT. THE BEARZ CTLR DSNDED 2 ORD ARR FLTS TO 16000 FT FROM FL240. UPON NOTICING THE TARGET CLBING TO FL180, THE BEARZ CTLR STOPPED THE ORD ARRS AT FL190. 1 ACFT HAD TO CLB FROM 18300 FT BACK TO FL190. LOSS OF SEPARATION AND AIRSPACE VIOLATION WERE NOT PROCESSED BY FAA SUPVR. THE 'STING' FLT WAS NON-STANDARD FORMATION. APPROX SEPARATION: 300 FT AND 4 MI, INSTEAD OF 1000 FT AND 6 MI.

#### Synopsis

ZAU CTLR OBSERVES A NON-COORDINATED, CLBING MIL FLT, PENETRATE AN ADJOINING CTL SECTOR AND CONFLICT WITH A DSNDING ACR.

**Time** 

Date : 199903 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

State Reference: PR

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 2500

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Make Model: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Approach Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 432127

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly. Airspace Violation: Entry

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment.Other ATC Equipment: Inter Facility Landline

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1
Resolutory Action.None Taken : Unable

**Supplementary** 

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: FAA

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

SIMULTANEOUS VISUAL APCHS IN USE TO RWY 8 AND RWY 10. I WAS WORKING W CTL SEQUENCING TO LAGOON VISUAL RWY 8 APCH. ACFT X, A DH8 INBOUND FROM SW DSNDING TO 1500 FT INTERCEPTING THE RWY 10 LOC, DID NOT SEE THE ARPT UNTIL HE HAD PENETRATED THE SJU TWR'S LCL RADAR APCH CTL AIRSPACE. I HAD BEEN TRYING TO CALL THE TWR ON THE LCL CTL OVERRIDE AND THE SHOUT LINE BUT COULD NOT GET A RESPONSE. BY THE TIME I ATTEMPTED TO TURN THE ACFT OUT, HE RPTED THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND I CLRED HIM FOR THE APCH. THE OVERRIDE LINE HAS NOT WORKED PROPERLY SINCE THE ICSS WAS WORKED ON. IT WORKED ONLY PERIODICALLY SINCE IT (THE ICSS) WAS INSTALLED. THE SHOUT LINE IS USED BY E CTL, W CTL, W FINAL CTL, AND FLT DATA POS. FLT DATA IS CALLED BY THE TWR (GND CTL) TO PASS THE DEP LINE UP. THE LINE IS TIED UP UNTIL YOU 'BREAK FOR CTL' THEN YOU HAVE TO WAIT FOR GND CTL TO TELL LCL CTL TO 'PICK UP' THE LINE. IN AN APCH CTL ENVIRONMENT WITH RADAR-TO-RADAR THIS SEEMS INADEQUATE.

#### Synopsis:

RPTR AT SAN JUAN CENRAP HAD TROUBLE TRYING TO CONTACT THE TWR ON EITHER OF THE 2 VOICE LINES. RPTR ALLEGES THAT THE OVERRIDE LINE ONLY WORKS PERIODICALLY AND THE OTHER LINE, THE SHOUT LINE, TAKES TOO LONG TO GET SOMEONE AT THE TWR. THIS SIT WAS BROUGHT TO LIGHT BY THE RPTR BECAUSE OF ACFT PENETRATING THE TWR'S LCL RADAR APCH CTL AIRSPACE WITHOUT PRIOR COORD.

#### **Time**

Date : 199903 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZDV.ARTCC

State Reference: CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDV.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDV.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar Experience.Flight Time.Total : 110

ASRS Report: 432315

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical

Anomaly.Conflict: NMAC

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Unable

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

### Supplementary

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

WE WERE BRIEFED THE OTHER DAY ABOUT THE NMAC THAT OCCURRED BTWN ACFT X AND ACFT Y ON MAR/XA/99. THE OVERRIDING PROB WAS THE INABILITY OF ATC TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH EITHER ACFT IN A TIMELY FASHION, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLOWED THE ACFT TO BECOME 'NORDO.' A PRACTICALLY PAINLESS AND 'FREE' PROC EXISTS FOR THIS TYPE OF EVENT TO BE PREVENTED, THOUGH IT'S ONLY 'RECOMMENDED' IN THE AIM, AND NOT 'REQUIRED' BY THE FARS: ALL ACFT THAT HAVE 2 RADIOS BE REQUIRED TO MONITOR GUARD (121.5 MHZ), AND ALL ACFT THAT OPERATE AT OR ABOVE FL180 BE REQUIRED TO HAVE AT LEAST 2 VHF TRANSCEIVERS (OR THE ABILITY TO MONITOR 121.5 INDEPENDENT OF THE MAIN COM RADIO). UTOPIA WOULD ALLOW FOR ALL ACFT TO HAVE 2 TRANSCEIVERS, BUT THIS MAY BE A FINANCIAL AND/OR PANEL PROB IN SMALLER ACFT. SINCE VHF IS A 'QUIET' RADIO, AS COMPARED TO HAVING TO LISTEN TO ALL THE STATIC ON AN HF RIG, MONITORING GUARD IS NOT A DISTR OR IMPEDIMENT TO THE FLC. OTHER BENEFITS ARISE FROM ALL 'FLT LVL FLIERS' MONITORING 121.5: AIRBORNE ACFT IN DISTRESS HAVE A MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF BEING HEARD SHOULD THEY BE OUT OF RANGE OF A LAND BASED GUARD SITE. ELT'S WOULD BE HEARD VIRTUALLY INSTANTLY, ALLOWING FOR MUCH FASTER RESPONSE AND RESCUE TIMES -- SO CRITICAL IN AN ACTUAL CRASH SCENARIO. AND AN ACFT THAT 'FLEW' OUT OF RANGE FROM ITS ASSIGNED ATC FREQ, OR COPIED THE WRONG FREQ ASSIGNMENT AND THE CTLR MISSED THE READBACK -- WHATEVER THE REASON FOR BEING ON THE 'WRONG' FREQ -- COULD BE CORRECTED BY EITHER DIRECT ATC-TO-ACFT ON 121.5 OR RELAYED THROUGH ANOTHER ACFT TO COVER FOR THE GND BASED COVERAGE PROBS. ACFT THAT GO NORDO ARE MORE COMMONPLACE THAN IS COMMONLY KNOWN. THIS SIMPLE REQUIREMENT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT THE FAA CAN PROVIDE. SINCE YOU NO DOUBT HAVE 'CONTACTS' WITHIN THE NTSB AND UPPER LEVEL FAA, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD FORWARD THIS SUGGESTION TO THEM FOR CONSIDERATION --ESPECIALLY IF YOU AGREE WITH IT.

#### Synopsis:

RPTR PRESENTED A SUGGESTION TO HAVE ALL ACFT THAT OPERATE IN THE PCA TO MONITOR GUARD (121 PT 5). RPTR CONTENDS THAT ACFT THAT BECOME NORDO FOR ANY REASON COULD STILL BE CONTACTED ON GUARD.

#### **Time**

Date : 199904 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 6000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 8000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Make Model: Baron 55/Cochise

### Aircraft / 2

Make Model: King Air C90 E90

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Departure Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1700

ASRS Report: 432822

#### Person / 2

Function.Controller: Approach

#### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

### **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

THESE ARE 2 SEPARATE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED WITHIN A FEW MINS WITH MOB APCH. ACFT #1 DEPARTED AL15, PROCEEDING NW TO THE M11 ARPT, CLBING TO 8000 FT. MOB APCH WOULD NOT TAKE THE HDOF, AND I HAD TO TURN THE ACFT TO THE NE TO REMAIN IN MY AIRSPACE. ACFT #2 WAS WBOUND, DSNDING TO 6000 FT, LNDG BFM. AGAIN, MOB APCH REFUSED TO TAKE THE HDOF. WHEN I ATTEMPTED TO SPIN THE ACFT, THE IRATE (JUSTIFIABLY) PLT CANCELED IFR. BOTH OF THE ACFT WERE ON IFR FLT PLANS, IN THE NAS SYS. THIS PROB WITH MOB APCH HAS BEEN ONGOING FOR MANY MONTHS. WE HAVE DOCUMENTED NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WHERE WE HAVE HAD TO SPIN ACRS, AIR TAXIES, CIVILIAN AND MIL BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A TIMELY HDOF. MANY OF US HAVE ALSO FILED UCR'S, TO NO AVAIL. THE CTLRS AT PNS APCH HAVE COMPLAINED FOR A LONG TIME ABOUT A PROB WE FEEL IS UNSAFE AND UNNECESSARY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ATTRIBUTES THESE INTERMITTENT, BUT CONSTANT, EVENTS TO PERSONALITY PROBS AT MOB APCH. THE 2 ACFT DESCRIBED IN THE EVENT WERE ON APPROPRIATE, LOA AUTH ROUTINGS. AUTOMATION WAS NOT A FACTOR, AND ACFT WERE IN PROPER HDOF MODE. THE RPTR IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH OTHER 'NONSTANDARD OPERATING PRACTICES' OBSERVED WITH CERTAIN MOB APCH PERSONNEL. THESE OTHER 'PRACTICES' MAINLY FOCUS ON THE EARLY TERMINATION OF VFR ACFT AND THE ASSOCIATED AUTOMATED TRACKED FLT PLANS. THE PNS CTLR IS REQUIRED TO ASK FOR PERTINENT INFO TO REINITIATE A TRACKED FLT THAT HAD BEEN ALREADY COMPLETE IN THE COMPUTER. THOUGH SIMILAR SITS HAVE BEEN OCCURRING FOR ALMOST 2 YRS, THE RPTR STATES THAT MGMNT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE THESE 'PERSONALITY ISSUES' WITH MOB.

#### Synopsis

PNS CTLR UNABLE TO EFFECT A HOOF ON A CLBING NWBOUND BE55 AND A DSNDING WBOUND BE91 TO MOB TRACON. BOTH ACFT REQUIRED ADDITIONAL VECTORS TO REMAIN OUTSIDE OF MOB AIRSPACE, PNS CTLR ALLEGES CONTINUING PROB WITH MOB CTLRS.

### **Time**

Date : 199904 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MCN.Airport

State Reference : GA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: MCN. Tower

Make Model: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 432925

### Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment.Other ATC Equipment : Radio - VHF

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken : Unable

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: FAA

ON THU, THE FAA COMMISSIONED A NEW ATIS FREQ FOR MCN (120.775). SHORTLY THEREAFTER MACON GND (121.65) BEGAN NOTICING BLEED OVER OF THE ATIS ON THE GND FREQ WHENEVER ANYONE WAS XMITTING TO THE GND CTLR. REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROB SEEM TO HAVE REDUCED THE OCCURRENCES OF THE BLEED OVER. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE COMPLETELY RESOLVED. INTERMITTENT OCCURRENCES HAVE BEEN NOTED. IT IS MY PROFESSIONAL OPINION THAT THE VERY NATURE OF THE BLEED OVER, WHEN IT OCCURS, IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE OP OF THE GND CTL POS.

#### Synopsis:

A TWR CTLR'S RPT ON FREQ BLEED OVER FROM THE ATIS INTO GND CTL FREQ WHEN ANY ACFT XMITTED TO GND CTL.

**Time** 

Date : 199903 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: IN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: Marginal

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: IND.TRACON Controlling Facilities.Tower: IND.Tower

Make Model: B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : IND.TRACON Controlling Facilities.Tower : IND.Tower

Make Model: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Departure

ASRS Report: 433044

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Local

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken: Insufficient Time

**Supplementary**Problem Areas: FAA

I WAS INVOLVED IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN A B727 AND A B737. THE FASTER SUCCEEDING DEP WAS TURNED INSIDE THE SLOWER PRECEDING DEP BY THE TWR CTLR. I BELIEVE THE PROB HEREIN LIES IN THE RECEIPT OF THE FLT INFO THAT THE TWR CTLR ISSUED WAS NOT PASSED ON TO ME IN A TIMELY MANNER. WE HAVE AN ANTIQUATED DROP TUBE SYS THAT XFERS A FLT PROGRESS STRIP BTWN THE TWR AND THE RADAR CTLR. WE HAVE 1 BOX FOR 2 DEP CTLRS THAT RECEIVE DEP STRIPS. THE SECOND STRIP WAS NOT IN MY POSSESSION IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ALLOW ME TO RECOGNIZE A SIT THAT WAS A POTENTIAL CONFLICT. SEPARATE DROP TUBES FOR EACH DEP CTLR OR ELECTRONIC XFER OF FLT INFO WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY ASSISTED ME IN RECOGNIZING WHAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO BE TAKEN SHOULD HAVE BEEN.

#### Synopsis:

CTLR HAD A LOSS OF SEPARATION ON A B727 AND A B737 ACFT DEPARTING IND.

#### **Time**

Date : 199909 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: SJC.Tower

State Reference : CA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Ground Experience.Flight Time.Total : 200

ASRS Report: 451104

#### Person / 2

Function.Instruction: Instructor Function.Controller: Local

#### Person / 3

Function.Instruction: Trainee Function.Controller: Local

#### Person / 4

Function.Controller: Supervisor

### Person / 6

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 5

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

#### Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Facility

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

I WAS WORKING GND CTL, THERE WAS TRAINING ON LCL CTL. I ASKED LCL CTL FOR APPROVAL TO CROSS RWY 30L AT TXWY G TO TXWY H. LCL CTL APPROVED THE RWY XING BEHIND A DEPARTING B737. WHEN THE B737 PASSED, I INSTRUCTED THE CESSNA CARAVAN TO CROSS RWY 30L FROM TXWY G TO TXWY H. AS THE CARAVAN TURNED ONTO THE RWY, THE TRAINEE CLRED AN ACR MD80 FOR TKOF ON RWY 30L. I TOLD THE TRAINEE THERE WAS STILL AN ACFT ON RWY 30L. THE TRAINEE SAID SOMETHING LIKE 'OH, SORRY' BUT TOOK NO CORRECTIVE ACTION. FINALLY, THE TRAINER DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AND CANCELLED THE ACR'S TKOF CLRNC. THIS SIT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE TRAINEE OR TRAINER HAD SCANNED THE RWY BEFORE ISSUING THE TKOF CLRNC. THE SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB MADE NO INVESTIGATION AND APPEARS NOT TO HAVE DONE ANYTHING ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THIS SUPVR APPEARS TO BE COVERING UP ALL SUCH OCCURRENCES. THE INCIDENT WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE TRAINING FORM.

#### Synopsis:

GND CTLR AT SJC ATCT RECEIVES A CONDITIONAL CLRNC FROM A LCL CTLR TRAINEE TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY. THE TRAINEE THEN CLRS ACR TFC FOR TKOF WHILE GND TFC IS XING THE RWY.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport

State Reference : CA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 451812

#### Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

ACFT INSTRUCTED TO MAKE R TFC RWY 29. PLT ACKNOWLEDGED AND SUBSEQUENTLY WAS CLRED RWY 29. PLT READ BACK INSTRUCTIONS AND CLRNC CORRECTLY. PLT LANDED RWY 30R. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: UNFAMILIAR WITH ARPT ENVIRONMENT. THIS WAS EVIDENT ON GND CTL WHEN PLT DID NOT FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. POSSIBLE RWY MARKINGS. FROM CTLR'S VIEW, PLT SOUNDED AS IF HE WAS FAMILIAR. DID NOT QUESTION CLRNC, WHICH LED THIS CTLR TO PAY LITTLE OR NO ATTN ONCE INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN. WORKLOAD OF CTLR, OBTAINING RELEASES FROM BAY APCH, ISSUING TA'S TO ACFT ON RADAR, COORDINATING WITH GND CTL TAKING HODGES FROM BAY, PREVENTS THE LCL CTLR FROM SCANNING RWYS AND, THUS, POSSIBLY PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF OCCURRENCES. THE RESPONSIBILITY PLACED UPON LIMITED RADAR CTLRS IS TOO MUCH AND SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO ELIMINATE IT. SEE FAA ORDER 7110.65 SECTION 8 PARAGRAPH 7-8-2 FOR A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF CLASS C SVCS. COPY AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.

#### Synopsis:

PLT OF A C150 LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY AFTER BEING CLRED TO LAND. TWR CTLR BLAMES HIMSELF FOR NOT OBSERVING THE C150 LINING UP TO LAND ON THE WRONG RWY DUE TO BEING TOO BUSY WITH OTHER DUTIES.

### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZSE.ARTCC

State Reference : WA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 451850

## Person / 2

Function.Controller: Supervisor

#### **Events**

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : ATC Facility

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

HOST/NAS COMPUTER OUTAGE FROM AA30 TO AD37. CTLRS WORKING WITH BACKUP SYS. THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF TFC IS MINIMIZED IF NOT JEOPARDIZED BY THE UTILIZATION OF THE BACKUP SYS. MANUAL COORD OF FLT PLANS, HDOFS, POINTOUTS, ETC, BECOMES MORE COMPLEX WHEN 3 AREAS FROM ZOA TRY TO HDOF TO 1 AREA AT ZSE.

#### Synopsis:

ARTIC CTLR AT ZSE CLAIMS A 7 MIN COMPUTER OUTAGE COULD HAVE MINIMIZED THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF TFC.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MBS.Airport

State Reference: MI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

### Component / 1

Aircraft Component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

Aircraft Reference : X Problem : Malfunctioning

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 451882

### Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight: Airport Manager

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Aircraft Equipment Problem: Critical Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew A: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Overcame Equipment Problem

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Aircraft Problem Areas : Airport

AT XA58Z A PA46 CALLED MBS APCH AND ADVISED HE DID NOT HAVE A POSITIVE GEAR INDICATOR LIGHT AND WANTED TO FLY BY THE TWR FOR A VISUAL INSPECTION. AFTER A FEW FLY-BYS, THE LCL CTLR STILL COULD NOT SEE IF THE GEAR WAS UP OR DOWN DUE TO LOW LIGHTING. THE PLT REQUESTED TO FLY NW TO CONSULT MANUALS. AT 35 DME NW OF MBS, THE CTLR REQUESTED THE PLT MAKE A 180 DEG TURN TO KEEP HIM IN OUR AIRSPACE. AT 18 DME W OF SAGINAW, THE PLT REQUESTED MANEUVERS TO TRY TO GET THE GEAR DOWN. AT XA17Z PLT ADVISED HE WAS INBOUND. THERE WAS A BA46 (JET) ON A 5 MI FINAL TO RWY 32, FOLLOWED BY A B190 ON A 10 MI FINAL TO RWY 32, BOTH ACFT HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO COMPLETE THEIR APCH PRIOR TO THE PA46 FLYING THE 18 MI. HOWEVER, THE ARPT OFFICIAL, WHO LATER ADMITTED SHE DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE PA46, ORDERED THE ARPT CLOSED TO ALL ACFT EXCEPT THE PA46. WHEN ADVISED OF THIS, THE B190 (AN AIR TAXI) ADVISED HE WAS LOW ON FUEL AND WOULD PROBABLY DIVERT. THIS ALL OCCURRED AT XA24Z. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESCUE VEHICLE MAKING THE ARPT CLOSURE BROADCAST, THE BA46 STATED HE WOULD FORGET THE FLY-BY AND JUST TRY TO LAND ASSUMING THE GEAR WOULD COLLAPSE. HE LANDED AT XA33Z, 9 MINS LATER. WE FEEL THE ARPT OFFICIAL INTERFERED WITH THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT BY INSINUATING THAT HE SHOULD LAND RATHER THAN COMPLETE ANOTHER FLY-BY. SHE ALSO CAUSED 2 AIR TAXI ACFT TO HOLD RATHER THAN LAND, CAUSING A DELAY FOR THEM. SINCE AIR TFC KNEW THE POS OF THE ACFT, ARPT OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT DICTATE THE LNDG SEQUENCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE TWR PERSONNEL WANTED TO RPT THEIR FRUSTRATION REGARDING THE INTERVENING BY THE ARPT OFFICIAL OF THEIR HANDLING OF THE SIT BY CLOSING THE ARPT TO ALL TFC EXCEPT FOR THE PIPER PA46. THEY BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE HANDLING THE SIT APPROPRIATELY AND GIVING WHATEVER ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO THE PA46 ACFT WITH THE GEAR PROB. THEREFORE, SINCE THE PA46 HAD FUEL AND DESIRE TO WORK OUT THE LNDG GEAR PROB, AND WAS FURTHER AWAY THAN EITHER OF THE ARRIVING COMMUTERS, THE ARPT DID NOT NEED TO BE CLOSED.

#### Synopsis:

PLT OF A PIPER PA46 MALIBU HAD DIFFICULTY EXTENDING THE LNDG GEAR AND MADE SEVERAL TWR FLY-BY PASSES TO CHK THE GEAR. SINCE THE CTLR COULD NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION AT NIGHT, THE PA46 THEN LEFT THE PATTERN FOR FURTHER GEAR CHK. IT THEN CAME BACK AND MADE A SUCCESSFUL GEAR DOWN LNDG.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 31000 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 32400

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZID.ARTCC Make Model : EMB ERA 145 ER&LR

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZID.ARTCC

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 451916

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

THE SECTOR WAS MODERATELY BUSY. I HAD 4 FL330 ACFT ON HEADINGS TO MISS EACH OTHER. I HAD A MOA HOT FL280 AND BELOW IN MY SECTOR WITH AN ACFT HEADING FOR IT THAT I WAS VECTORING AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. ACFT #2 WAS AT FL310 SWBOUND. I HAD SWITCHED ACFT #2 AROUND PXV VORTAC. ACFT #1 WAS NEBOUND ABOUT 40 MI FROM PXV VORTAC WHEN I TOOK THE HDOF. ACFT #1 WAS AT FL330. ACFT #1 NEEDED TO BE DSNDED BECAUSE HE WAS A CVG ARR. UPON HDOF I REALIZED I NEEDED TO DSND ACFT #1 EARLY TO AVOID OTHER FL330 ACFT. I DSNDED ACFT #1 ABOUT 20 MI SW PXV VORTAC OVERLOOKING ACFT #2 AT PXV VORTAC. AFTER DSNDING ACFT #1 TO FL310, I WENT TO THE OTHER PART OF MY SECTOR TO ADJUST HEADINGS ON THE OTHER FL330 TFC. THEN I DSNDED ANOTHER ACFT BEFORE LOOKING BACK AT ACFT #1. WHEN I DID LOOK AT ACFT #1 HE WAS AT FL324 7 MI HEAD-ON WITH ACFT #2. I IMMEDIATELY CLBED ACFT #1 BACK TO FL330. BOTH ACFT HAD TCASII AND NEITHER HAD AN ALERT. MULTIPLE CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEMS ACTIVATED.

 $Synopsis: \\ ZID\ CTLR\ FAILED\ TO\ RECOGNIZE\ VERT\ LOSS\ OF\ SEPARATION\ ON\ OPPOSITE\ DIRECTION\ TFC,\ BOTH\ DSNDING\ TO\ FL310.$ 

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SJU.Airport

State Reference: PR

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 452057

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

### Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : ATC Facility

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Navigational Facility

ACR X DEPARTED MDPC CLIMBING TO FL330. ACR Y SEBOUND AT FL330, NON-RADAR. ACR X WAS ON A VECTOR AROUND SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE. THE ICSS (INTERFACILITY COMMUNICATION SWITCHING SYS) FAILED AND COM WAS LOST WITH BOTH ACFT. RADIO AND LANDLINE COM WAS LOST. AFTER SOME MINUTES, I WAS ABLE TO RELAY TO ACR X THRU TWR TO PROCEED DIRECT TO 22 N 60 E. TURN WAS ISSUED TOO LATE AND NON-RADAR SEPARATION WOULD BE LOST WHEN ACR X WENT OFF RADAR OR IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. THE NON-RADAR CTLR WAS ABLE TO GET THRU TO COMMERCIAL RADIO ON AN OUTSIDE LINE AND CLB ACR Y. WE REMAINED WITHOUT RADIO AND LANDLINE COM AT THE POSITIONS FOR MORE THAN 1 1/2 HOURS. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED REFRESHER TRAINING ON THE PORTABLE TRANSCEIVERS AND COULD NOT SELECT THE FREQS I NEEDED (121.5). WE COULD NOT 'REMAP' (PROGRAM) THE ICSS BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE THE TRAINING NOR WERE THE STEPS IN THE CIC BINDER. THIS LAST FAILURE OCCURRED ON APR/XA/98 PREVIOUSLY AND AN UCR WAS SUBMITTED. MANAGEMENT LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE PASSWORDS AND PROCEDURES WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CIC BINDER. THIS WE FOUND OUT WAS FALSE. HAD THIS FAILURE OCCURRED 30 TO 45 MINUTES LATER, THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE. WE ROUTINELY APPROVE AND COORDINATE WRONG FOR DIRECTION ACFT WITH THE BELIEF THAT WE WILL HAVE THEM IN RADAR FOR 45 MINUTES TO 1 HR IN ORDER TO PUT THEM AT AN APPROPRIATE ALT OR VECTOR THEM AROUND EACH OTHER. IF WE DO NOT, ACFT WOULD BE FLYING FROM FL180 UP TO FL390 OR FL410. FROM SAEZ TO KJFK AND VICE VERSA. THE PREVIOUS FAILURE AFFECTED ONLY 2 SECTOR CTL POSITIONS (R4/D4) AND WE WERE ABLE TO USE ANOTHER SECTOR. THIS FAILURE WAS AT ALL POSITIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FSS WHICH IS ON THE SAME COMPUTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THE ICSS HAD FAILED ONCE LAST YEAR WITHOUT KNOWN RESOLUTION. THIS TIME WITH CIC ON DUTY DURING MIDNIGHT CONFIGURATION. WITH 3 CTL POSITIONS OPERATING WHEN THE ICSS FAILED. FAC PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE FOR CIC PASSWORD ACCESS, ONLY SUPVR. NO SUPVR WAS AVAILABLE IN THE CTL ROOM. SINCE THE SYS FAILURE THE RPTR ADVISES THAT MANAGEMENT HAS NOT YET PROVIDED PASSWORD ACCESS OF ADDITIONAL CTLR TRAINING TO 'REMAP' THE ICSS DURING THE MIDSHIFT. RPTR ADVISED HE WAS CONCERNED WITH SYS SAFETY DUE TO LACK OF ICSS TRAINING.

#### Synopsis:

ZŚU CTLR CLIMBS L101 INTO CONFLICT WITH ENROUTE MD80, EXPECTING TO APPLY ANOTHER TYPE OF APPROVED SEPARATION, WHEN EQUIPMENT FAILURE INTERRUPTS THE TIMELY APPLICATION OF POSITIVE SEPARATION.

**Time** 

Date : 199910 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

**Place** 

State Reference: KS

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 29000

**Environment**Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC

Make Model: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC

Make Model: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 452378

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Controller: Traffic Management

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Supplementary

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

MD80 (X) FILED MCI TO ORD DURING BUSY ORD PUSH -- DID NOT FIT IN OVERHEAD STREAM AND WAS VECTORED INTO TFC, B737 (Y), OMS TO STL. ESTABLISHED PROC CALLS FOR MCI DEPS TO CLB TO FL230 ON 050 DEG HDG. ZKC TMU INSTRUCTED MD80 TO BE TURNED N FOR SEQUENCING, INTO TFC, AND NOT AS COORDINATED BY SOP. TO AVOID DELAYS, ZKC TMU, WILL RELEASE DEPS WITHOUT REGARD TO SECTOR VOLUME AND OVERHEAD STREAM -- THE INCREASE IN COMPLEXITY IS FORCING CTLRS TO TAKE RISKS INVOLVING SAFETY TO AVOID GND DELAYS. THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT -- IT INVOLVED THE VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED/COORDINATED PROCS, AN OPDEV.

#### Synopsis:

ZKC CTLR CONCERNED WITH ZKC TMU FAILING TO COMPLY WITH ZKC SATELLITE RELEASE POLICY FOR ENRTE INTEGRATION INTO ORD TFC FLOW.

**Time** 

Date : 199910 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 800 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 1700

**Environment**Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: SJC. Tower

Make Model: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer li/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 452496

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

**Events** 

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation : Track Or Heading Deviation

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Overshoot Anomaly. Inflight Encounter: Weather Anomaly. Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment.Other ATC Equipment: RADAR

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Facility

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Navigational Facility

THE GS AT SJC HAS BEEN OTS AT SAN JOSE FOR SEVERAL WKS. SO, WE HAVE BEEN USING THE LOC DME RWY 30L APCH. THE CHEROKEE (X) WAS ON A NORMAL APCH UNTIL 1 MI INSIDE OF IRONN INTXN, WHEREAT THE STEP-DOWN ALT IS 1700 FT MSL. AT 4 MI FINAL, THE PA28 STARTED TO DIVERGE L OF FINAL AND CONTINUE DSCNT. BY THE TIME I NOTICED, THE PA28 WAS 1 MI L OF COURSE OF 1000 FT MSL AND DIVERGING. I ISSUED THE LOW ALT ALERT, INCLUDING THE MINIMUM VECTORING ALT WHICH IS 2000 FT MSL. THE MSAW DID NOT SOUND THE ALARM UNTIL THE PA28 WAS 1 1/2 MI OFF COURSE AT 800 FT, AT WHICH POINT HE STARTED CLBING. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE WE STARTED USING THE LOC/DME APCH, I'VE OBSERVED NUMEROUS INSTANCES WHERE THE MSAW ALARMED EVEN THOUGH THE ACFT WERE ABOVE THE PUBLISHED DSCNT ALTS OF 1700 FT MSL UNTIL IRONN AND 700 FT MSL UNTIL THE MDA. IT SEEMS LIKE A REVIEW OF THE PROGRAM PARAMETERS MAY BE IN ORDER.

#### Synopsis

SÍC LCL CTLR OBSERVES PA28 OFF COURSE AND ISSUES CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTIONS. CTLR CONCERNED THAT MSAW DID NOT INCIDENT ALERT IN A TIMELY FASHION.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: SCT.TRACON

State Reference : CA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar Experience.Flight Time.Total : 60

ASRS Report: 452530

### Person / 2

Function.Controller : Local Function.Controller : Radar

### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment.Other ATC Equipment: ARTS 3E

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

### Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : ATC Facility

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: FAA

WHILE VECTORING ACFT X ON A BASE LEG TO INTERCEPT THE BRACKETT ILS NBOUND, DATA TAG CONVERTED TO A '0K.' ALL ACFT IDENT, ACFT TYPE, SPD, AND ALT WAS LOST AT A CRUCIAL POINT OF THE APCH. DATA TAG HAD BEEN HANDED OFF TO BRACKETT ATCT WHEN IT DISAPPEARED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADDED THAT SINCE THE INSTALLATION OF THE ARTS IIIE APPROX 1 1/2 YRS AGO, PROBS MAKING MECHANICAL HDOFS TO POC HAVE OCCURRED. CTLRS HAVE BEEN FILING UCR'S WITHOUT ANY IMPROVEMENT SHOWN. RPTR CLAIMS THAT MGMNT HAS TOLD THEM THAT AS SOON AS THE LOA WITH POC IS UPDATED THE PROB WILL BE FIXED.

#### Synopsis

RPTR AT SCT CLAIMS THAT OCCASIONALLY WHEN HANDING OFF A RADAR DATA TAG TO POC TWR, CRITICAL DATA IS LOST TO BOTH SCT AND POC. RPTR SAID THE PROB BEGAN WHEN THE ARTS IIIE WAS INSTALLED APPROX ONE AND ONE HALF YRS AGO.

**Time** 

Date : 199910 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

State Reference: VA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 3000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: Marginal

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: IAD.TRACON
Make Model: Skylane 182/Rg Turbo Skylane/Rg

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: IAD.TRACON

Make Model: Gulfstream II

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Approach

ASRS Report: 452595

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

C182 (ACFT X) WAS ISSUED AN EBOUND VECTOR FOR BASE LEG TO ILS RWY 16L TO HEF. I WAS ALSO WORKING IAD ARRS INBOUND ON COATT 3 (BARIN INTXN) STAR. I WAS DISTR WITH SEQUENCING ARRS FOR IAD. I FORGOT TO TURN C182 ONTO LOC FOR ILS RWY 16L TO HEF. C182 CONTINUED E STRAIGHT ACROSS LOC 1L&R TO IAD. C182 WAS ISSUED TFC (GLF2, ACFT Y) NBOUND ON IAD RWY 1R LOC. C182 SAW TFC. GLF2 HAD APCH CLRNC CANCELED AND WAS ASSIGNED AN ALT ABOVE C182.

#### Synopsis:

IÁD CTLR FORGETS C182 ON VECTOR TO HEF. C182 CROSSES IAD FINAL APCH COURSE AND CONFLICTS WITH GLF2.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZDC.ARTCC

State Reference: VA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

#### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 452685

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

### Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

### **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

HAD 2 ACFT TO PHL, 1 ACFT X AT FL350 AND 1 ACFT Y AT FL330. INTENDED TO DSND THE FL330 DOWN TO FL290 PRIOR TO STARTING VECTORING FOR IN-TRAIL, AND UNINTENTIONALLY DSNDED THE ACFT AT FL350 BY MISTAKE. WHEN CONFLICT ALERT STARTED, TURNED THE DSNDING ACFT R TO RE-ESTABLISH 5 MI.

Synopsis: ZDC CTLR ISSUES CLRNC TO WRONG ACFT CAUSING CONFLICT WITH OTHER ENRTE ACFT.

**Time** 

Date : 199910 Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: OH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 19000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC

Make Model: Bae 125 Series 1000

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOB.ARTCC

Make Model: B757-200

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 453290

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Supplementary

Problem Areas: Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

I HAD JUST RELIEVED A CTLR WHO HAD ACFT DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY THAN I WANTED. WITHIN A FEW MOMENTS, I ATTEMPTED TO SET THE SECTOR TO MY PREFERENCE. ACR X WENT N TOWARDS TORONTO BUT WAS HEADED E OVER DJB VORTAC. I TURNED ACR X L 020 DEG HDG, OVERLOOKING HIS REQUEST ALT 17000 FT. I ALSO CLBED HIM TO FL230. ACR Y WAS INBOUND DTW VIA CETUS 2 ARR DSNDING TO 17000 FT. INITIALLY, I HAD WANTED TO TURN ACR Y R FOR ACR X. HOWEVER, IN MAKING OTHER CTL DECISIONS THIS WAS OVERLOOKED. WHEN I REALIZED THIS, ACR Y WAS TURNED R TO 360 DEG HDG AND DSNDED. ACR X WAS TURNED FURTHER L TO 340 DEG HDG AND KEPT CLBING.

#### Synopsis

ZOB CTLR INITIATES CHANGE TO PREVIOUS CTLR'S SEQUENCING BUT DOES NOT ENSURE SEPARATION BTWN DSNDING AND CLBING TFC SEQUENCED INTO DTW.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CAK.Airport

State Reference : OH Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: CAK. Tower

Make Model: Learjet 35

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: CAK. Tower

Make Model: Learjet 24

#### Person / 1

Function.Instruction: Trainee

Function.Controller: Clearance Delivery

Function.Controller : Ground ASRS Report : 453492

#### Person / 2

Function.Instruction: Instructor

Function.Controller: Clearance Delivery

Function.Controller: Ground

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic

# Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

ACFT #1 WAS GIVEN A TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 23 AFTER HE RPTED HIS POS WAS AT FBO-1. IS AN FBO AT ZZZ ARPT. IT IS LOCATED ON THE E SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. THE APCH END OF RWY 23 IS ALSO LOCATED ON THE NE END OF THE FIELD. THERE ARE NO OTHER RWYS TO CROSS BTWN FBO-1 AND RWY 23. TXWY E PARALLELS THE RAMP AREA THAT LEADS INTO FBO-1 AND IS THE TXWY THAT LEADS TO THE APCH END OF RWY 23. ANOTHER ACFT THAT WAS GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBO-1 TO RWY 23, WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW ACFT #1 (LR35) TO RWY 23. AT THIS TIME ACFT #1 INDICATED HE WAS ON THE W SIDE OF THE ARPT. ACFT #1 WAS INSTRUCTED IMMEDIATELY TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19 AT TXWY H.' ACFT #1 WAS OBSERVED JUST ENTERING ONTO TXWY H. HOWEVER, THERE WAS ANOTHER LEARJET (ACFT #2) DEPARTING RWY 19. BECAUSE OF ACFT #1'S ERRONEOUS POS RPT AND BECAUSE OF THE ZZZ ARPT'S MGMNT FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION ON THE FOLLOWING, THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR A CATASTROPHE. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION THIS TIME, BUT I BELIEVE THE POTENTIAL EXISTS EVERYDAY! FBO-1 IS AN FBO ON THE SIDE OF CAK ARPT. THIS IS USUALLY REFERRED TO AS FBO E. THIS IS BECAUSE AT ONE TIME, FBO-1 WAS ALSO LOCATED ON THE WNW SIDE OF THE FIELD. THIS ONE NO LONGER EXISTS. THE FBO ON THE W SIDE NOW IS 'FBO-2.' IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING ACFT USING 'FBO-2' ARE INSTRUCTED TO SAY 'FBO-2' WHEN ASKED THEIR POS AND THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS INSTRUCTING THEM ALSO. HOWEVER, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THERE ARE SIGNS WITH 'FBO-1' ON THEM, STILL IN VIEW ON THE W SIDE. THESE 'OLD' SIGNS MISLEAD PLTS AS TO THEIR POS AND AS IN THE CASE BE GIVEN WRONG TAXI INSTRUCTIONS.

#### Synopsis:

ZZZ DEVELOPMENTAL CTLR RECOGNIZES TAXIING ACFT HAS RPTED TAXIING FROM AN INCORRECTLY IDENTED ARPT FBO AND CORRECTS CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY FOR DEPARTING TFC.

#### **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: KS

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 29000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC

Make Model: Talon

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZKC.ARTCC

Make Model: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 453966

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Assigned Altitude

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

THE MD80, ACR Y, WAS AT FL290 NBOUND. THE T38, ACFT X, WAS CLBING NEBOUND TO AN ASSIGNED ALT OF FL280. CONFLICT ALERTED WAS ACTIVATED AS ACFT X CLBED THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT. MODE C INDICATED FL284 AS I ASKED ACFT X TO SAY ALT. THE PLT HESITATED, THEN RESPONDED THAT HE WAS AT FL280. ACR Y ADVISED THAT THEY HAD A TCASII ALERT AND WERE CLBING TO AVOID TFC, AT THE SAME TIME THE MODE C OF ACFT X INDICATED HE WAS CONTINUING HIS CLB, FINALLY LEVELING AT FL289. THE TARGETS APPEARED TO MERGE WITH 700 FT VERT SEPARATION (DUE TO ACR Y'S EVASIVE MANEUVER). I AGAIN ASKED ACFT X TO SAY ALT AND HE CLAIMED FL280, THOUGH MODE C STILL INDICATE 900 FT HIGH. A COUPLE MINS AFTER THE 2 ACFT PASSED, ACFT X SHOWED LEVEL AT FL280. MYSELF, AS WELL AS OTHER ATC PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT HAD THE FEELING THAT THE PLT WAS MISREPRESENTING HIS ACTUAL ALT. I WAS RELYING ON THE MIL PLT TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE APPARENT CONFLICT SINCE HE HAD THE BETTER PERFORMING ACFT AND SEEMED TO BE AT THE WRONG ALT. I WAS VERY DISMAYED TO SEE THAT HE TOOK NO EVASIVE ACTION WHATSOEVER AND CONTINUED DIRECTLY TOWARD THE TFC. ALSO VERY DISTURBING WAS THE LACK OF ACTION ON THE PART OF FAA PERSONNEL TO CHK OUT THE PLT'S CLAIMS OF ERRONEOUS MODE C TO DETERMINE IF THE PLT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THIS DANGEROUS SIT OR NOT.

#### Synopsis:

MIL T38 CLBED 900 FT ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT CAUSING AN ACR MD80 TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION.

**Time** 

Date : 199910 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

State Reference: AL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 9000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : P31.TRACON Make Model : PA-31 Navajo Chieftan/Majave/Navajo

Aircraft / 2

Make Model: Mentor (T-34)

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Approach

ASRS Report: 454186

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Supplementary

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

PA31 AIRSPACE IS COMPRISED OF ALERT AREA 292. ACFT Y WAS SQUAWKING A BEACON CODE THAT INDICATED AEROBATIC ACTIVITY, BUT WAS NOT ACTUALLY IN THE ALERT AREA. ACFT X SAW THE AEROBATIC ACFT AFTER I MADE A TFC CALL, BUT BECAUSE OF THE AEROBATIC NATURE OF ACFT Y, ACFT X HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. I THINK THESE AEROBATIC ACFT SHOULD REMAIN WITHIN THE ALERT AREA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ONLY ADDED THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE APPROX 2 MI SSE OF JKA ARPT AND THAT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT OCCURS OFTEN.

#### Synopsis:

MIL T34 AT JKA CONDUCTING AEROBATIC MANEUVERS CAUSED A PA31 TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: BUF.Tower

State Reference : NY **Environment**Flight Conditions : IMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: BUF.Tower

Make Model: DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

## Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: BUF. Tower

Make Model: B727-200

## Person / 1

Function.Controller: Combined Local Experience.Flight Time.Total: 650

ASRS Report: 454213

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

## Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Events

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Missed Approach Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic

## Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

LCL AND GND CTL COMBINED. RWY 5 IN USE (APCH END DIFFICULT TO SEE BECAUSE OF POORLY MOUNTED RAMP LIGHTS, DARKNESS, RAIN AND OBSTRUCTIONS). SEVERAL MINS AFTER I ASSUMED LCL CTL AND GND CTL A DC9 CALLED, 'READY.' I ASSUMED THE ACFT MEANT READY TO TAXI BECAUSE ON THE POS RELIEF FROM THE OTHER CTLR NOTHING WAS MENTIONED ABOUT A DC9 TAXIING, THE ACFT IDENT WAS NOT WRITTEN DOWN ON THE SCRATCH PAD, AND THE FLT PROGRESS STRIP WAS IN THE INACTIVE BAY. I RESPONDED 'ACR X TAXI RWY 5.' ACFT RESPONDED 'ACR X ROGER.' I DID NOT HAVE ANY GND TFC BTWN DC9'S RAMP AND RWY. I LOOKED TOWARD THE RAMP AND SAW AN ACFT WHICH I ASSUMED WAS THE DC9, BUT WAS AN ACFT PARKED NEARBY. I CLRED THE B737 TO LAND (WX 400 FT OVCST). THE DC9 ASKED 'WHAT RWY WERE WE USING?' I RESPONDED RWY 5. DC9 THEN ASKED WHERE THE B737 WAS. I RESPONDED A 1 1/2 MI FINAL. THE DC9 THEN INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS ON THE RWY. THE B737 WAS ON A SHORT FINAL AT WHICH TIME HE WAS SENT AROUND. CAUSES: POOR POS RELIEF BY PRECEDING CTLR. ASSUMPTION BY DC9 PLT THAT 'TAXI RWY 5' MEANT THAT HE COULD TAXI INTO POS. NO READBACK BY PLT. LIGHTING CONDITIONS. ASSUMPTION BY MYSELF THAT PARKED ACFT WAS THE TAXIING ACFT.

#### Synopsis:

A DC9 AT THE BUF ARPT, HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY, TAXIED INTO POS WHEN THE CTLR SAID, TAXI TO RWY 5. TFC ON SHORT FINAL WAS SENT AROUND.

**Time** 

Date : 199911 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 31000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZID.ARTCC

Make Model: DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZID.ARTCC

Make Model: Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454504

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

ZZZ HIGH ALT SECTOR AT ZID WAS ON THE VERGE OF BEING OUT OF CTL. THIS IS A DAILY OCCURRENCE. ACR X CALLED AT FL340 FOR FL330. I ISSUED ACR X TO MAINTAIN FL310. HOWEVER, I WAS WORKING OFF THE DATA BLOCK WHICH READ FL330. I OBSERVED ACR X AT FL325 AND TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN FL330. THERE WERE TOO MANY ACFT IN THE AIRSPACE WITH NO FLOW RESTRS. THIS SECTOR ROUTINELY GOES 'RED' AND NOTHING IS DONE ABOUT IT. SOMEONE IS GOING TO GET KILLED IF WE DON'T RELIEVE SOME OF THE ACFT LOAD IN THAT SECTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WORKS THE ZZZ HIGH SECTOR AT ZID. HE SAID THAT 5 OR 6 TIMES A DAY THE SECTOR BECOMES EXTREMELY BUSY AND COMPLEX BECAUSE OF TFC DEPARTING. MOST OF THE TFC, INCLUDING ENROUTES, CONVERGE ON THE ROSEWOOD VOR. HE SAID SECTOR IS IN 1 OR 6 AREAS AND HAS HAD 90% OF THE OPERRORS, WHICH HE STATES IS OFTEN. HE SAID THE INCIDENT IN THIS RPT WAS BTWN AN ACR DC9 DSNDING TO FL310 WITH AN ACR CARJ AT FL310. IT WAS THE FIRST OF TWO OPERRORS THAT WK ON THE SECTOR. HE SAID WHEN THE FACILITY TFC MGMNT UNIT PUTS IN FLOW RESTRS, THEY ARE USUALLY REMOVED BY THE WASHINGTON FLOW CTLRS.

#### Synopsis:

ZÍD CTLR CLRED A DC9 TO FL310 WITH A CARJ AT FL310.

**Time** 

Date : 199907 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5500

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: P31.TRACON

Make Model: Mentor (T-34)

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: P31.TRACON

Make Model: MD-88

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Departure

ASRS Report: 454452

Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Critical

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

THE MIL ALLOWS ITS ACFT TO PERFORM AEROBATICS ANYWHERE IN ALERT AREA 292. THIS T34 WAS CONDUCTING AEROBATICS 5 MI OFF THE DEP END OF RWY 17 AT PENSACOLA REGIONAL. JETS MUST DEPART RWY HEADING TO COMPLY WITH NOISE ABATEMENT. I DO NOT FEEL IT IS SAFE TO CONTINUE TO ALLOW THE T34 STUDENTS TO CONDUCT 'AIRSHOW-TYPE' MANEUVERS IN ACR ARR DEP CORRIDORS. THE PROB COULD BE SOLVED IF THE MIL WOULD CONFINE THESE ACTIVITIES TO N OF THE BRENTON, AL, AREA.

#### Synopsis:

A DEP CTLR AT PA31 HAS SAFETY CONCERNS WHEN AN MD88 DEPARTS PNS INTO AN AREA WHERE A MIL T34 TRAINER WAS CONDUCTING AEROBATICS MANEUVERS.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MRY.Airport

State Reference: CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 2100

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: Mixed

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZOA.ARTCC

Make Model: Challenger Cl600

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454563

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Approach

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Diverted To Another Airport Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Missed Approach Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

BACKGROUND ACFT X WAS INBOUND TO SJC FROM AVE. HE COULD SEE MRY AND REQUESTED CHANGE DEST TO MRY AND WENT DIRECT. MRY APCH CLOSES AT XA00, BUT DID STAY OPEN UNTIL XB00 TO GET 4 ACFT IN USING RWY 28L. WX WAS OK TO THE E. OTHERWISE CTR TAKES AIRSPACE AND IT IS 1 IN 1 OUT NON RADAR. AS ACFT X GOT NEAR MRY HE REQUESTED APCH TO BE SAFE. SO, I ISSUED VECTOR TO PARALLEL LOC MRY WAS CLOSED. VECTORED ACFT X FAR OUT OVER WATER TO LOSE ALT GAVE A 130 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 10R AT OR ABOVE 2100 FT. SAW ACFT TURN TO 070 DEGS. LUCKILY GOT RADIO CONTACT AND TOLD TO CLB TO 7000 FT. HE SAID SOMETHING WAS FUNNY WITH THE RWY 10R LOC. I ASKED HIM TO DOUBLE-CHK IDENT BECAUSE RWY 28 LOC/DME IS NOT ON SAME FREQ. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, GOT CALL FROM MRY FROM OUT OF BREATH AND PANIC CTLR ASKING IF SOMEONE WAS TRYING TO LAND AT MRY. HE FORGOT TO SWITCH OVER TO RWY 10R ILS AFTER THE LATE NIGHT USE OF RWY 28 LOC/DME. (NORMAL SOP IS RWY 10R FOR MID OPS -- WE HAVE NO CTL OR INDICATION OF NAVAID AT MRY.) BY LUCK I PROVIDED VECTORS TO ACFT X. NORMAL PLAN IS ESTABLISH ON RTE SNS-MR OR V27-MR AND TERMINATE RADAR WELL BEFORE MRY. HE WAS STILL ON FREQ ALTHOUGH NOT AT FIRST, UNTIL THE LINE OF SIGHT OPENED UP SO HE COULD HEAR ME. NO OTHER PLANES AROUND TO RELAY. HE WAS GETTING REVERSED SENSING AND WAS CONFUSED. ALSO I DON'T THINK HE IDENTED THE NAVAID. ALSO, BY THE WAY HE ARRIVED AND REQUESTED THE APCH, THE VECTORS FOR INTERCEPT, ACTUALLY TOOK THE ACFT TO BOTH SIDES OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE, MAKING A MENTAL PICTURE OF THE DIRECTION OF INTERCEPT HARDER. PLT EVEN SAID HE WAS S OF COURSE WHEN IN FACT HE WAS N. IT NEVER OCCURRED TO HIM HE WAS ON THE BACK COURSE UNTIL WE DISCUSSED TO IDENT NAVAID AND MRY CTLR CALLED. WE NEED TO MAKE SURE RWY 10R ILS IS ON AT NIGHT AND PLTS NEED TO STILL IDENT NAVAID. ACFT X WENT TO SJC AND LANDED SAFELY.

#### Synopsis:

ZOA ARTCC CTLR CLRED A CPR CL600 FOR ILS APCH TO RWY 10 AT MRY, BUT ILS EQUIP HAD NOT BEEN SWITCHED OVER FROM THE RWY 28L ILS.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport: JFK.Airport

State Reference : NY Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: JFK. Tower

Make Model: Jetstream 41

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Ground Experience.Flight Time.Total : 550

ASRS Report: 454590

## Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4300 Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 184 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 445

ASRS Report: 454589

## Person / 3

Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2400
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 150
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1000

ASRS Report: 454317

## **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

AN JS41 TAXIED OUT OF TXWY K ONTO RWY 31L, AND THEN TURNED OFF OF THE RWY. THE PLT SAID THAT HE WAS CONFUSED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 454589: ON NOV/MON/99, MY CAPT BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT JFK TWR HAD CALLED HIM UNOFFICIALLY REGARDING A SUPPOSED TAXI INFRACTION WHICH WAS TO HAVE OCCURRED NOV/SUN/99 AT APPROX XA50 HRS. THE CALL FROM THE TWR WAS A HEADS UP CALL IN REF TO A RPT BEING FILED BY THE CTLR WORKING GND CTL AT THE TIME OF ACCUSATION. IT IS ALLEGED THAT ON NOV/SUN/99, AT APPROX XA50 HRS, MY CAPT AND I CROSSED A HOLD SHORT LINE AT TXWYS K-L AND RWY 31L AND CONTINUED OUT ONTO THE RWY. THIS ACCUSATION COMPLETELY SURPRISED ME AS WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI FROM THE RAMP VIA TXWY K, L TXWY B TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY F FROM RWY 31R. AT NO TIME DURING OUR TAXI DID WE CROSS ANY HOLD SHORT LINES OR ANY RWYS UNTIL WE WERE CLRED TO POS AND HOLD RWY 31R VIA TXWYS Z-A. I AM AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN HOW THIS CTLR COULD EVER RPT OUR POS BEING ANYWHERE NEAR RWY 31L.

#### Synopsis:

GND CTLR AT JFK ALLEGES THAT A JS41 CREW TAXIED ONTO A RWY WITHOUT AUTH.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : UYF.Airport

State Reference : OH Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: CMH.TRACON

Make Model: Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear

#### Person / 1

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4000 Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100 Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2200

ASRS Report: 454740

## Person / 2

Function.Controller: Approach

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2

Resolutory Action.Other: Controller Called Airport Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

TERMINATION OF IFR NIGHT FLT UNDER VMC. CMH APCH CTL ASKED ME TO CLOSE FLT PLAN WITH HIM AFTER BEING RELEASED TO MONITOR/TALK ON LCL CTAF 123.0 DURING LNDG PHASE OF FLT. WAS SO CONCENTRATED ON MAKING IT TO GAS PUMP BY CLOSING TIME (TIME ARPT CLOSED AND WAS LEFT UNATTENDED FOR THE NIGHT) THAT I FORGOT TO CLOSE IFR FLT PLAN. AFTER ABOUT 10 MINS, CMH CALLED ARPT ATTENDANT TO CONFIRM I WAS DOWN AND SAFE. NO EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO CLOSE PLAN. MY CONCERN WAS LEGITIMATE AS ATTENDANT POINTEDLY TOLD ME HE HAD TO STAY 10 MINS BEYOND HIS QUITTING TIME TO SVC MY AIRPLANE. NOTWITHSTANDING, CLOSING FLT PLAN IS MY WORK, NOT HIS.

#### Synopsis

SMA PLT FORGOT TO CLOSE HIS IFR FLT PLAN AT AN UNCTLED FIELD.

## **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

**Place** 

State Reference: AZ

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 5900

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: TUS. Tower

Make Model: A320

Aircraft / 2

Make Model: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local Function.Controller : Supervisor

ASRS Report: 457741

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation: Controlled Flight Towards Terrain

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 3
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

THE AIRBUS WAS 5900 FT ON VISUAL APCH OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN WHEN IT RECEIVED A TA AND RA TO DSND. THE PLT ADVISED HE WAS DSNDING BECAUSE OF TCASII RA. THE CTLR ISSUED THE MVA OF 5700 FT. THE AIRBUS STOPPED DSCNT AT 5600 FT WHEN THE RA CEASED. THERE WAS NO KNOWN OR OBSERVED TFC NEAR THE AREA.

Synopsis: TUS ATCT CTLR RECEIVED CALL FROM AN A320 PLT AT 5900 FT RESPONDING TO A TCASII RA TO DSND. MVA WAS 5700 FT AND THE PLT DSNDED TO 5600 FT.

**Time** 

Date : 199911 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

State Reference: NY

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 12500

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZBW.ARTCC

Make Model: Fokker 100

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZBW.ARTCC

Make Model: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar Experience.Flight Time.Total : 530

ASRS Report: 454763

Person / 2

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454762

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

**Events** 

Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 4 Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

**Supplementary** 

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

THE RADAR CTLR WAS TALKING TO ACR X ON A PAX FLT FROM ORD TO HPN. THE ACFT WAS DSNDING ON THE VALRE 2 ARR. AS THE ACFT APCHED THE WEARD INTXN THE PLT ADVISED HE WAS RESPONDING TO AN RA FROM HIS TCASII. THE ONLY TARGET ON THE SCOPE HAD NO ALT RPTING. WE SOON FOUND THE #2 ACFT IN THIS INCIDENT WAS BEING SUPPRESSED IN THE CONFLICT ALERT LIST FROM AN ALERT WITH ANOTHER ACFT. SUPPRESSING THIS ALERT HAD STOPPED A MODE C READOUT FROM THE VFR ACFT ON BOTH OF THE SCOPES I WAS WORKING WITH AS WELL AS THE SCOPE OF THE CTLR THAT HAS GIVEN US THE ACR X ACFT. WHEN THE CONFLICT ALERT SUPPRESSION WAS DEACTIVATED, THE MODE C OF THE VFR ACFT, (ACFT Y), CAME ON TO BOTH SCOPES WITH THE ALT SHOWING WITHIN 200 FT OF ACR X AND WELL WITHIN 1 MI. BY THIS TIME THE PLT OF ACR X HAD ALREADY TAKEN ACTION TO AVOID THE COLLISION. THIS CONFLICT ALERT PROB SEEMS TO BE A KNOWN PROB WITH THE NEWLY INSTALLED DSR EQUIP. THIS HAS HAPPENED TO ME BEFORE, BUT THIS IS THE CLOSEST I HAVE HAD 2 ACFT COME TOGETHER TO DATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 454762: I WAS WORKING THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS AT A SECTOR WHEN WE HAD XFERRED CTL AND COM OF ACR X. THE ADJOINING SECTOR HAD SUPPRESSED CONFLICT ALERT ON ACFT Y FOR ANOTHER ACFT. THIS CAUSED THE MODE C OF ACFT Y TO DISAPPEAR FROM OUR RADAR SCOPE (A KNOWN PROB WITH THE NEW DSR EQUIP). NOT KNOWING THE ALT OF ACFT Y WE DID NOT NOTIFY THE NEXT SECTOR OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH ACR X. A TCASII RA WAS INITIATED BY ACR X, WHICH PREVENTED A POSSIBLE MIDAIR COLLISION.

#### Synopsis:

AN F100 WITH ZBW CTLR HAS A TCASII RA DURING DSCNT AND TAKES EVASIVE ACTION. THE INTRUDER TFC WAS VFR WITH AN ADJACENT SECTOR WITH ALT SUPPRESSED.

# **Time**

Date : 199910 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SLC.Airport

State Reference: UT

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

# Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454783

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Altitude Deviation: Crossing Restriction Not Met

Independent Detector.Other.Controller : 1
Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Other: CTLR CLARIFIED CLRNC

# Supplementary

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas: FAA

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

ON OCT/XA/98, SLC APCH CTL CHANGED THE SPECIFIED ARR ALTS FOR LNDG S ON THE BEARR 3 AND BRIGHAM CITY 1 ARRS. THE PUBLISHED STARS STATE TO EXPECT TO CROSS BEARR AT 15000 FT AND EXPECT TO CROSS CARTR AT 16000 FT. ON OCT/XA/98. CHANGES WERE FORCED UPON ZLC REQUIRING SWAPPING THE GATE ALTS. NOW BEARR AT 16000 FT AND CARTR AT 15000 FT. THE STARS HAVE BEEN UPDATED MANY TIMES IN THE LAST 13+ MONTHS, YET THEY STILL STATE 'EXPECT TO CROSS' AT THE OLD ALTS. THIS IS AN ONGOING SAFETY ISSUE AS WELL AS BREACH OF PROC. I HAVE FILED A UCR AT MY FACILITY AND HAVE HAD ZERO ACTION TAKEN. CALLS TO THE FAA ADMINISTRATOR HOTLINE YIELD NO RESULTS. MY FIRST LEVEL SUPVR HAS TOLD ME HE WILL NOT GO TO THE FACILITY MGR ANY MORE BECAUSE OF THE ALMOST VIOLENT REACTION IT DRAWS! I SPEND EACH SESSION ON THIS SECTOR RESTATING/CORRECTING ALT RESTRS AND VERIFYING ALT RESTRS TO PLTS WHO ARE LOOKING AT A CHART EXPECTING TO HEAR ONE THING AND HEARING SOMETHING ELSE. NO ONE (NON CTLRS) IN THE FAA IS WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS IS A PROB. NOW 13+ MONTHS LATER THERE IS NO ACTION IN THE WORKS TO RECTIFY THE PROB. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL AN EVER DILIGENT CTLR MISSES A BAD READBACK AND AN ACFT DSNDS TO 15000 FT INSTEAD OF 16000 FT. PLEASE PUT FORTH AN EFFORT MOTIVATE THE FAA TO CORRECT THESE PUBS OR PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS TO CORRECT ON THE AVERAGE OF 10% OF TFC ON THE STAR ROUTING WITH REGARD TO THE ALT EXPECTED AND DESIRED FOR THE XING FIXES INVOLVED FOR THE PAST 14 (NOW) MONTHS SINCE THE STARS CHARTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT THE NEW ALT. HE STATED THAT ALL CTLRS SPEND EXTRA TIME WITH EACH PLT IN ORDER TO EMPHASIZE THE NEW EXPECTED ALT WHICH IS NOT YET DEPICTED ON THE PLT'S CHARS.

#### Synopsis:

ARTIC RADAR CTLR COMPLAINS THAT 2 STAR ARR CHARTS TO THE SLC ARPT NEED TO BE AMENDED TO REFLECT THE ACTUAL EXPECTED XING ALT FOR 1 MAIN FIX WHICH HAS BEEN IN USE FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS. THIS HAS CAUSED THE CTLRS TO TAKE EXTRA TIME TO RESTATE THE NORMALLY USED ALT SINCE PLTS DO NOT ALWAYS PICK UP THE CHANGE AND HAVE PREPARED THEIR ACFT'S FMC FOR THE OLD DEPICTED ALT.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: WI

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 5700 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 6400

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMP.ARTCC Make Model : Atp Advanced Turboprop

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZMP.ARTCC

Make Model: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer li/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454945

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

**Events** 

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation : Track Or Heading Deviation Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

**Situations** 

Aircraft.Aircraft Component.Value: 34.352

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

ACFT X WAS LEVEL AT 6000 FT SBOUND. ACFT Y WAS LEVEL AT 6400 FT NWBOUND RECEIVING VFR TA'S. I ISSUED A TA TO ACFT X AS '12 O'CLOCK, 1 1/2 MI, 6400 FT, A PIPER CHEROKEE.' ACFT X RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN A DSCNT AND A R-HAND TURN BECAUSE OF A TCASII RA. THIS SIT IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A SIT WHERE THE 2 ACFT WERE SEPARATED AND IN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT, AND THEN TCASII MADE IT A POTENTIALLY UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT BY DIRECTING A TURN AND DSCNT. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN TFC BELOW THAT WE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT BECAUSE OF MARGINAL RADAR COVERAGE.

#### Synopsis:

ARTCC CTLR ISSUED ADVISORIES TO AN IFR BRITISH ATP AND A VFR PIPER PA28 WHICH WERE SEPARATED ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE AND ALT. HOWEVER, THE ATP CREW HAD ALREADY DSNDED AND TURNED IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA. CTLR BELIEVES THAT TCASII IN THIS INCIDENT CAUSED AN UNSAFE CONDITION IN LIEU OF PREVENTING ONE.

**Time** 

Date : 199911 Day : Wed

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

**Place** 

State Reference: OH

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 31000

**Environment**Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454991

Person / 2

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 454989

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 5

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 3 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 4

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

I WAS WORKING THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS AT THE IRL SECTOR. TFC WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND COMPLEX. AN OVERTAKE WAS NOT NOTICED UNTIL ACFT WERE APPROX 6 MI APART. ACTION WAS TAKEN BY RADAR CTLR. AT THIS TIME BOTH ACFT WERE TURNED AND ONE WAS DSNDED. THE ACTIONS WERE NOT TIMELY ENOUGH TO PREVENT AN OPERROR. THE COMPLEXITY AND THE VOLUME OF TFC MAKE THIS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SECTOR. MANY CTL ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED WITH LITTLE TIME TO ANALYZE SITS CAUSING MISTAKES IN OVERSIGHTS AND JUDGEMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 454989: EXTREMELY BUSY SECTOR. SAME DIRECTION OVERTAKE SIT. WHEN PROB IS REALIZED, ONE ACFT IS TURNED L, THE OTHER ONE R. BOTH ACFT TURN R AND SEPARATION IS LOST. AT THIS POINT DON'T KNOW WHETHER WRONG DIRECTION WAS GIVEN TO A PLT OR WHETHER HE SIMPLY TURNED THE WRONG WAY.

#### Synopsis:

ARTCC RADAR CTLR AT ZOB ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS INTENDED TO DIVERGE SAME DIRECTION TFC TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION, BUT BOTH ACFT MAY HAVE TURNED R RESULTING IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Sat

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport

State Reference : VA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: IAD. Tower

Make Model: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Traffic Management

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 150

ASRS Report: 455361

## Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly: Smoke Or Fire Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Declared Emergency

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Landed In Emergency Condition

# **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

ACR X DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. ACFT LANDED AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY. ACFT WAS SWITCHED TO GND CTL 132.45. ACFT WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH CRASH FIRE RESCUE DUE TO FIRE VEHICLES NOT HAVING BOTH GND CTL FREQS. THIS ALSO RESULTS IN VEHICLES MOVING ON THE ARPT UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE CTLR WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AREA. I FEAR IT IS A RWY INCURSION WAITING TO HAPPEN.

#### Synopsis:

IÁD CTLR CONCERNED WITH ON-ARPT EMER GND PERSONNEL NOT HAVING ALL TWR GND CTL FREQS WHEN ASSISTING EMER ACFT ON THE ARPT.

**Time** 

Date : 199911 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

**Place** 

State Reference: IN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Make Model: EMB-110 All Series

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Approach

ASRS Report: 455384

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Radar

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 4

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

**Events** 

Anomaly. Airspace Violation: Entry

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Exited Penetrated Airspace

Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

R3401A WAS HOT AT 10000 FT (NONSTANDARD ACTIVITY -- R3401 IS NEVER HOT AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT). THE E110 WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN YIP, VFR AT 4000 FT. ZID ADVISED R3401 WAS HOT AT OR BELOW 10000 FT. THE ACFT PENETRATED R3401A. THE FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE. I, AS THE CTLR, AGREE IT HAPPENED. ALTHOUGH I CHKED ALL PERTINENT STATUS INFO AREAS BEFORE TAKING THE POS, I IGNORED THE DATA IN THE STATUS INFO AREA INDICATING R3401A WOULD BE HOT BECAUSE: 1) R3401A IS NEVER HOT AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT -- IF HOT ON EVENINGS, ONLY AT LOW ALTS. 2) MESSAGES DISTRIBUTED BY ARTCC'S HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ENCRYPTIC IN THEIR MEANINGS. INSTEAD OF STICKING WITH STANDARD DATA (IE, A HOT 240 UNTIL XA00 THEN COLD UNTIL XM00), MESSAGES DISTRIBUTED BY ARTCC'S HAVE BECOME UNTIL XM00), MESSAGES DISTRIBUTED BY ARTCC'S HAVE BECOME UNTIL XM00, MESSAGES DISTRIBUTED BY ARTCC'S HAVE BECOME THEN COLD UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED). HARD TO UNDERSTAND, REQUIRING TIME CONSUMING PHONE CALLS TO PEOPLE WHOSE ATTITUDES SHOW DURING THE CALL (IE, 'WHAT A STUPID QUESTION!'). ADDITIONALLY, ZID INDICATED THEY WERE TRYING TO CALL BEFORE THE ACFT ENTERED THE RANGE. ZID DID NOT CALL. IF THEY MEANT THAT THE RANGE OFFICER IN R3401A WAS TRYING TO CALL, THIS IS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE FAA HAS REMOVED THE DIRECT LINE TO ZID. IN MY OPINION, THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THE ERROR.

#### Synopsis:

APCH CTLR AT ZID ALLOWED AN E110 ACFT TO ENTER A RESTR AREA THAT WAS IN HOT STATUS.

**Time** 

Date : 199911 Day : Sun

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

**Place** 

State Reference: MI

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 33000

Environment

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZAU.ARTCC

Make Model: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZAU.ARTCC

Make Model: A320

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 455394

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Handoff Position Experience.Flight Time.Total: 250 Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 15

ASRS Report: 455393

Person / 3

Function.Controller: Radar

Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 6

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 5

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

**Events** 

Anomaly. Conflict: Airborne Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment: TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 4 Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 5 Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Evasive Action

**Supplementary** 

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

I WAS WORKING THE RADAR POS ALONE, NOT VERY BUSY. ZOB CALLS ME AND TELLS ME THEY CAN'T TAKE ANY MORE EWR FLTS -- I'M IN THE HOLD. I HAD ACR X 10-15 MI FROM THE ZOB BOUNDARY. I ALSO HAD ANOTHER EWR FLT 25 MI IN TRAIL. I TURNED ACR X TO A 360 DEG HDG AND THEN ISSUED A PRESENT POS HOLD. I HAD TO GO BACK AND SHUT OFF THE OTHER DEPS BELOW HIM TO ENSURE SEPARATION. I THEN HAD TO VECTOR THE IN TRAIL EWR FLT DOWN TO THE S. IN THE MEANTIME, I HAD ACR Y FILED GIJ..KLANT GOING OVERSEAS. I PUT HIM ON A 350 DEG VECTOR TO GO AROUND THE HOLDING PATTERN AIRSPACE. SINCE ACR X WAS NOT EVEN IN MY AIRSPACE ANYMORE, I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THE OTHER SECTOR'S FL330 TFC. THERE WAS ALSO FL310 TFC, SO I COULDN'T DSND EITHER ACFT. WHEN THE 350 DEG HDG WASN'T WORKING, I ADJUSTED THE PLAN AND TURNED TO A 070 DEG HDG, DSNDED TO FL310, THE TURNED FURTHER R TO 090 DEGS. I TURNED ACR X FROM A 270 DEG HDG TO A 330 DEG HDG. THEY PASSED, ACCORDING TO THE NTAP, 4.6 MI AND 900 FT. THIS WAS THE THIRD TIME THAT NIGHT ZOB PLACED US IN NO NOTICE HOLDING FOR EWR. IT'S A VERY COMMON OCCURRENCE AND FORTUNATELY THERE'S NEVER BEEN AN ERROR BEFORE THIS ONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. THIS SIT IS VERY DANGEROUS NO MATTER HOW MANY ACFT ARE ON THE FREQ. ACR X DID RESPOND TO A TCASII RA AND CLBED TO FL335. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 455393: I WAS AT THE HDOF POS AT KEELER SECTOR. ZOB HAD JUST SLAMMED US IN THE HOLD. THE RADAR CTLR WAS VECTORING (OR HOLDING) ACR X WBOUND AT FL330. ACR Y WAS PUT ON A NBOUND VECTOR TO AVOID TFC. ACR X WAS IN EMPIRE SECTOR'S AIRSPACE, WHICH STARTS AT FL330 AND UP. BELOW IS PULLMAN SECTOR'S AIRSPACE. WHEN IT WAS CLR THAT ACR Y AND ACR X WOULD BE IN CONFLICT, I COORDINATED A DSCNT TO FL310 FOR ACR X. THE RADAR CTLR INSTEAD TURNED ACR Y E AND DSNDED TO FL310. SEPARATION WAS LOST, ALTHOUGH IT APPEARED THAT THE ACFT PASSED BY AT LEAST 5 MI.

#### Synopsis:

ZAU ARTCC CTLR VECTORING ACR TFC EBOUND IS TOLD BY ZOB ARTCC THEY WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT ANY MORE ACFT TO EWR.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BTV.Airport

State Reference: VT

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 1800 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 3000

#### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: Marginal

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: BTV.Tower Make Model: Fighting Falcon F16

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: BTV. Tower

Make Model: Beech 1900

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller: Local

Experience.Flight Time.Total: 1200

ASRS Report: 455418

#### Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2100
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 30
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1900

ASRS Report: 456021

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation: Track Or Heading Deviation

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Weather Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

## Supplementary

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas: Weather

A FLT OF 3 F16'S (X) WERE PROCEEDING STRAIGHT IN TO RWY 15 FOR AN OVERHEAD APCH, L BREAK, 1800 FT BREAK ALT. THERE WAS A B1900 (Y) COMMUTER THAT DEPARTED RWY 19 ON RWY HDG. THIS ACFT WAS TURNED R HDG 320 DEGS AND LEVEL 2000 FT ABOUT 3 MI SW OF THE ARPT. THE F16'S DID NOT BREAK L BUT TURNED W. THEY WERE ABOUT 1 MI W OF THE FIELD WHEN THEY ADVISED THEY COULDN'T BREAK L BECAUSE OF A CLOUD. THEY WERE HEADED DIRECTLY AT THE B1900 AND I GAVE THEM AN IMMEDIATE TURN AND CLB TO GET AWAY FROM THE COMMUTER. WE SPOKE WITH THE F16 FLT LEADER LATER AND ADVISED HE CAN'T JUST BREAK OFF HIS APCH AND TURN ANY WAY HE WANTS WITHOUT TELLING US, AT 350 KTS, IF HE TURNS IN AN UNEXPECTED DIRECTION. IT MAY CAUSE CONFLICTS VERY QUICKLY. THE PLT SAYS THAT HE TURNED R OUT OF THE PATTERN BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO STAY CLR OF CLOUD. HE SAID THE WX WAS BETTER TO THE W. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 456021: WX AT BTV RPTED AS 6000 FT BROKEN AND 6 MI VISIBILITY. CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 15 AT BTV. SOMEWHERE BTWN 1-3 MI OFF OF THE APCH END AT 1800 FT MSL (GOING TO INITIAL) IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE BREAK COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO A CLOUD DIRECTLY OVER THE FIELD AND E OF THE FIELD. WHILE DEVIATING TO THE W SLIGHTLY TO MAINTAIN CLR OF CLOUDS, A XMISSION TO TWR WAS MADE TO INFORM THAT THE OVERHEAD PATTERN COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND REQUESTED VECTORS BACK TO RADAR. TWR GAVE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO 360 DEGS AND CLB TO 3000 FT. A COMMUTER B1900 RPTEDLY HAD TO REACT TO TCASII ADVISORIES AS WE DEVIATED 1/2 MI W AROUND THE CLOUD. TWR RPTS ALSO THAT LEGAL SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED AND NO VISUAL CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED BTWN THE ACFT. MY COMMENTS: THE ATIS HAD NOT UPDATED PROPERLY. ACTUAL CONDITIONS OVERHEAD WERE ACTUALLY 2000 FT AND 3 MI. I WOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED AN OVERHEAD IF ATIS WAS CLOSE TO ACTUAL CONDITIONS. I QUESTION TCASII PRECISION IN A MANEUVERING ENVIRONMENT. THE B1900 HAD JUST DEPARTED RWY 19 AND TURNED R TO 320 DEGS. I DON'T THINK WE WERE REALLY A CONFLICT.

#### Synopsis:

BTV CTLR RECOGNIZES THAT F16 FLT TURNS CONTRARY TO INSTRUCTIONS AND COMES INTO CONFLICT WITH B190 DEPARTING FROM ANOTHER RWY, ISSUING ALTERNATE CTL INSTRUCTIONS.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: AGC.Tower

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

#### **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

## Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: AGC. Tower

Make Model: Baron 58/58tc

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: AGC. Tower

Make Model: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

## Person / 1

Function.Controller: Flight Data Function.Controller: Ground Function.Controller: Supervisor Experience.Flight Time.Total: 70

ASRS Report: 455625

## Person / 2

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

## Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas: FAA

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, ANY TIME, ACFT WILL RPT 121.1 MAIN XMITTER 'WEAK, GARBLED AND/OR UNREADABLE.' SOMETIMES SWITCHING TO BACKUP WILL RECTIFY THE PROB TEMPORARILY. HOWEVER, PERMANENT FIXES, SUCH AS 'CHANGING THE CARD' OR REPLACING THE ENTIRE ICSS CONSOLE COMPLETELY ONLY SERVE AS AN IMMEDIATE YET TEMPORARY SOLUTION. THE ELECTRICAL AND COM WIRING IN THE TWR HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE SUBSTANDARD IN THAT THERE IS INEFFECTIVE GNDING. THIS PROB HAS BEEN KNOWN AND RPTED TO FAA MGMNT IN BOTH THE AIR TFC AND AIRWAYS FACILITIES DIVISION AT ALLEGHENY TWR. IT HAS BEEN COMMON KNOWLEDGE FOR AT LEAST 6 MONTHS. IN ADDITION TO THE INTERRUPTION OF AIR TFC SVCS DUE TO COM FAILURE/BREAKDOWN, ELECTRICAL 'ARCS' HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AND RPTED TO AIR TFC MGMNT AND COUNTY OPS. THESE 'ARCS' HAVE OCCURRED ON LIGHTING PANELS LOCATED ON THE TWR CONSOLE. THE LOCATION OF THE LIGHTING PANELS ARE IMMEDIATE TO THE FAA COM EQUIP. WIRING, INCLUDING PWR, SHARE JOINT ACCESS FROM BELOW THE TWR CAB INTO THE CONSOLE AREA. INSPECTION OF TWR LIGHTING PANELS BY COUNTY ELECTRICAL PERSONNEL ALSO REVEALED AND CONFIRMED A GNDING DEFICIENCY. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT UNTIL THE GNDING IS CORRECTED AND/OR PWR AND COMS WIRING IS REPLACED, THE SAFETY OF AIR TFC PERSONNEL, DUE TO POSSIBLE ELECTRICAL SHOCK, AND AIR TFC SVC INTERRUPTION, DUE TO COM FAILURE, IS AT AN UNACCEPTABLE HIGH RISK. ALL OF THIS IN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF AIR TFC MGMNT, AIRWAYS FACILITIES MGMNT, AND COUNTY ARPT MGMNT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE TWR IS VERY OLD AND OVER THE PAST 8 YRS ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIP HAS BEEN ADDED AND CONNECTED TO OLD WIRING WHICH IN SOME CASES IS NOT GNDED. SOME OF THE EQUIP IN THE TWR BELONGS TO THE ARPT, SUCH AS LIGHTING CTLS AND SOME EQUIP IS FAA OWNED. BOTH RADIO AND RADAR OUTAGES OCCUR FREQUENTLY. MAINT PROBS ARE RARELY SOLVED BY THE TECHNICIANS. WHEN SOMETHING IS FIXED, CTLRS VIEW THE REPAIR AS TEMPORARY. AT THE PRESENT TIME AN EVALUATION TEAM FROM THE FAA REGIONAL OFFICE IS LOOKING AT THE OVERALL PROB. THE TEAM ALLEGEDLY ACKNOWLEDGE THERE IS A PROB AND HAVE STATED IT WILL TAKE UP TO 18 MONTHS TO FIX. THE TWR CONSTANTLY RECEIVES COMPLAINTS FROM PLTS AND SEVERAL UCR'S FILED BY CTLRS HAS FAILED TO GET RESULTS.

#### Synopsis:

ATCT CTLR AT AGC STATES RADIO FREQS AND LANDLINES ARE FREQUENTLY UNUSABLE, UNREADABLE OR GARBLED.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: ZDC.ARTCC

State Reference: DC

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 36600 Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 37000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC Make Model : Commercial Fixed Wing

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 455698

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

CPR ACFT Y LEVEL AT FL350, SBOUND ON J61. ACR X NEBOUND AT FL370. CTLR STARTED ACR X DOWN TO FL280. CTLR REALIZED CONFLICT AND CLBED ACFT X BACK TO FL370. ACR X MODE C NEVER SHOWED BELOW FL366 BUT ACFT X DIDN'T RPT BACK TO FL370. PRIOR TO LATERAL SEPARATION BEING ESTABLISHED.

Synopsis:
A ZDC CTLR STARTED ACR X DOWN TOO SOON, NOT REALIZING AT FIRST THAT THERE WAS OPPOSITE DIRECTION CPR TFC 2000 FT BELOW ACR X. ZDC, DC.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: PIT.Tower

State Reference : PA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: PIT.TRACON Controlling Facilities.Tower: PIT.Tower

Make Model: Beech 1900

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Clearance Delivery

ASRS Report: 455724

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation : Altitude Heading Rule Deviation

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

THIS COMMUTER AIRLINE, ACR X, A COMMUTER AIRLINE FOR A COMPANY, ROUTINELY AND INCORRECTLY FILES THROUGH A CANNED FLT PLAN WRONG ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT TO YOUNGSTOWN AND MORGANTOWN OUT OF PIT. NO REASON FOR THOSE ALTS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. JUST INCORRECT REQUESTED ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT.

#### Synopsis

ATCT CTLR AT PIT TWR CLAIMS A COMMUTER AIRLINE FILES INCORRECT ALTS ON DAILY FLT PLANS.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZPH.Airport

State Reference: FL

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13500

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: TPA.TRACON

Make Model: Twin Otter DHC-6

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Approach Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2400

ASRS Report: 455770

## Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

## **Events**

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter: Skydivers
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Separated Traffic
Resolutory Action.None Taken: Insufficient Time

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

THIS IS TO BRING ATTN TO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT INVOLVING JUMP ACFT AND OTHER ACFT, INCLUDING IFR OVERFLTS, IN THE VICINITY OF THE ZPH ARPT. THIS ARPT LIES WITHIN THE LATERAL BOUNDARIES VICTOR 7, A FEDERAL AIRWAY THAT RUNS BTWN CROSS CITY (CTY) AND LAKELAND (LAL) VORS. OVERFLTS ARE ROUTED, BY LOA, VIA V7, FROM 3000 FT TO 12000 FT MSL. THE JUMP ACFT REMAIN CLR OF THE CLASS B AIRSPACE AT TPA APCH, ALSO BY LOA, AND CLB TO 13500 FT. THEN THEY GIVE APCH A 2 MIN WARNING BEFORE DROPPING THE JUMPERS. WE (TPA APCH) ISSUE ADVISORIES AND/OR SAFETY ALERTS TO THE JUMP ACFT, INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS TO 'HOLD JUMPERS UNTIL ADVISED FOR TFC.' SOMETIMES THE JUMP ACFT QUESTION OUR JUDGEMENT ON THE FREQ, OR WORSE YET, ADVISE US THEY ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF LEAVING THE ACFT. (THIS USUALLY HAPPENS WHEN THERE IS SO MUCH TFC THAT EITHER THE JUMP ACFT OR THE CTLR HAS MISSED A CALL). I THINK SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO AVERT POSSIBLE CONFLICTS, SUCH AS A NEW LOA SUCH AS: 1) APCH HAS MORE CTL OF THE JUMP ACFT, OR 2) RERTE TFC AWAY FROM THE JUMP ZONE. AGAIN, I BELIEVE THIS IS POTENTIALLY A VERY DANGEROUS SIT THAT I FEEL OBLIGED TO BRING TO SOMEONE'S ATTN.

#### Synopsis:

ATC TRACON CTLR RECOMMENDS REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF THE LOA BTWN HIS FACILITY AND THE MAJOR SKYDIVING OPERATOR WITHIN THE FACILITY CLASS E AIRSPACE DUE TO REPEATED CLOSE INFLT ENCOUNTERS BTWN ACFT AND SKYDIVERS.

#### **Time**

Date : 199911 Day : Fri

Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: N90.TRACON

State Reference : NY Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Person / 1

Function.Controller : Approach Experience.Flight Time.Total : 450

ASRS Report: 455780

#### **Events**

Anomaly. Maintenance Problem: Improper Maintenance

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Consequence.Other: Emotional Trauma Consequence.Other: Physical Injury

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: Maintenance Human Performance

AT APPROX XA50 ON NOV/XA/99, THERE WAS A MAJOR DISRUPTION OF AIR-GND COMS AND RADAR DATA THROUGHOUT ALL POS OF THE NEW YORK TRACON. THE PROB APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN AS YET UNIDENTIFIED FAILURE IN THE MCI TELCO SYS. ALTHOUGH THE DISRUPTION WAS RELATIVELY BRIEF, INJURY TO OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ('TONE' INJURY) WAS SUSTAINED. RPTEDLY, PROBS PERSISTED INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

#### Synopsis:

APCH CTLR AT N90 RPTED A MAJOR BUT BRIEF AIR-GND FAILURE RESULTED IN TONE INJURY TO OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL.

#### **Time**

Date : 199912 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PVD.Airport

State Reference: RI

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: PVD. Tower

Make Model: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities. Tower: PVD. Tower

Make Model: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Ground Experience.Flight Time.Total : 200

ASRS Report: 456591

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1 Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Alert

## Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance

ACR X B737 TAXIING FOR RWY 34 ON TXWY C WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5R FOR ARR TFC. OBSERVING THE MOVEMENT OF ACR X, I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT WAS CROSSING THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND I IMMEDIATELY TOLD ACR X TO STOP. I ADVISED THE ACR X PLT THAT THE HOLD LINE WAS BEHIND HIM AT THIS TIME TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE HOLD LINE WAS FOR RWY 34. THIS SIT HAS OCCURRED WELL TOO MANY TIMES ON THIS TXWY AND TXWY B ON THE OTHER SIDE. THE HOLD LINES ARE DISPLACED SO FAR AWAY FROM THE RWY THAT NUMEROUS ACFT ARE NOT ADHERING TO THEM. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS PROB WITH HOLD LINES WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONFUSING TO MOST PLTS.

#### Synopsis

B737 FLC PASS THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINE AND ARE STOPPED SHORT OF RWY BY THE PVD GND CTLR DUE TO TFC ON APCH TO CROSSING RWY.

#### **Time**

Date : 199912 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

## Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: ZZZ.Tower

Make Model: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Ground ASRS Report : 456600

## Person / 2

Function.Controller: Local

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1 Resolutory Action.None Taken : Unable

Resolutory Action.Other: Recommend Phraseolgoy Change

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas: FAA

I AM PRESENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE FAA AS A CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CTLR AT THE ATCT AT AN INTL ARPT. IT HAS RECENTLY COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT A CHANGE TO PROCS WHICH HAD THE INTENTION OF PREVENTING RWY INCURSIONS AND ACCIDENTS ON ACTIVE RWYS WILL HAVE EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. ALTHOUGH WELL INTENTIONED, THE NOTICE IS NOT WELL THOUGHT OUT AND, IF IMPLEMENTED, WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN A CATASTROPHE ALONG THE LINES OF THE TENERIFE DISASTER. AS LONG AS I HAVE BEEN AN ATC (THE MIL PORTION OF MY ATC CAREER BEGAN IN 1983), IT HAS BEEN A WELL ESTABLISHED TENET OF THE BUSINESS THAT MISCOMS ARE UNAVOIDABLE AND THAT TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS AS A RESULT OF THOSE MISCOMS. SIMILAR SOUNDING INSTRUCTIONS OR WORDS ARE TO BE AVOIDED. THE TERM 'TKOF,' FOR EXAMPLE IS ONLY USED IN THE ACTUAL XMISSION OF A CLRNC FOR TKOF. IN OTHER XMISSIONS THE TERM 'DEPARTURE' IS USED TO PREVENT A PLT HOLDING IN POS FROM HEARING THE TERM 'TKOF' AND ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMING IT IS A CLRNC MEANT FOR HIM. IT IS A BACK-UP SAFETY NET THAT UNTIL NOW HAS WORKED ADMIRABLY. FAA NOTICE N7110.206, EFFECTIVE JUL/XA/99, HAS PHRASEOLOGY CHANGES THAT A GND CTLR IS TO REQUEST A RWY CROSSING FROM THE LCL CTLR AND IS IDENTICAL TO NOT ONLY THE LCL CTLR'S POSITIVE REPLY BUT IDENTICAL TO THE CLRNC ISSUED TO THE ACFT OR VEHICLE WHICH INTENDS TO CROSS. I FORESEE A SIT WHEREIN: 1) AN ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF AN ACTIVE RWY IN A LOW VISIBILITY SIT REQUESTS TO CROSS THAT ACTIVE RWY. 2) THE GND CTLR USING THE PHRASEOLOGY AS SPECIFIED IN THE NOTICE SAYS TO LCL 'CROSS RWY 18 AT TXWY B.' 3) UNBEKNOWNST TO GND CTL, HE HAD A 'HOT MIKE' AT THE TIME. 4) THE ACFT HOLDING TAKES THAT AS A CLRNC TO CROSS (I CERTAINLY WOULD). 5) LCL CTL REFUSES THE OP DUE TO AN ACFT ON DEP ROLL OR ON SHORT FINAL. 6) WHILE LCL AND GND ARE NOW COORD WHEN THE OP CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE SAFELY, IT IS TAKING PLACE. IT IS MY CONTENTION THAT UNLESS THIS PROC IS MODIFIED IN A WAY THAT WILL PREVENT THE 'HOT MIKE' SCENARIO FROM OCCURRING THERE WILL BE ACCIDENTS AS A RESULT. STEPS MUST QUICKLY BE TAKEN TO MODIFY THE PHRASEOLOGY SO THAT IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD BY ALL OPERATIONAL CTLRS THAT THE WORD 'CROSS' BE ONLY USED IN THE ACTUAL AUTHORIZATION BY EITHER LCL OR GND CTL TO THE VEHICLE OR ACFT INVOLVED.

#### Synopsis:

TWR CTLR COMPLAINT REGARDING A CHANGE IN THE PHRASEOLOGY BETWEEN THE GND AND LCL TWR CONTROLLERS FOR TAXIING ACFT APPROVAL TO CROSS ACTIVE RWYS.

**Time** 

Date : 199912 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

State Reference: TX

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 6000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: 190.TRACON

Make Model: Challenger Cl600

Component / 1

Aircraft Component: FMS/FMC

Aircraft Reference : X Problem : Design Deficiency

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Approach

ASRS Report: 457802

Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 4

Function.Oversight: Supervisor

**Events** 

Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation: Track Or Heading Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Supplementary

Problem Areas: Aircraft

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

AT APPROX XA20 I OBSERVED ACFT X, A CL60, MISS AN ASSIGNED TURN (HDG 300 DEGS AT DRXLR). HE DID NOT TURN LATE, BUT ABOUT 5 MI PRIOR TO DRXLR, UNATTENDED, THIS WOULD HAVE PUT HIM IN CONVERGING CONFLICT WITH IAH ARR TFC. THIS ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED TO HOU VIA THE SSLAM ARR. THE HDG ASSIGNED IS STANDARD FOR TFC ENTERING DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12R. I OBSERVED THE ABNORMALITY AND BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTN OF THE RECEIVING CTLR AND THE SUPVR. WHEN QUERIED, THE PLT STATED THAT FLT DIRECTOR TURNED HIM EARLY BASED ON HIS SPD (210 KTS ASSIGNED). IF THAT IS IN FACT THE CASE, THEN THE PARAMETERS OF THIS ACFT'S FLT DIRECTOR ARE PERILOUSLY OUT OF TOLERANCE. AGAIN, WITHOUT IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION, THIS FLT DIRECTOR PUT THE PEOPLE ON ACFT X IN HARMS WAY.

#### Synopsis:

A CHALLENGER 600 FLC BEGAN A TURN PRIOR TO THE FIX NEAR HOU. ARTCC RADAR CTLR IS CONCERNED THAT THE EARLY TURN COULD RESULT IN A TFC CONFLICT.

**Time** 

Date : 199912 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place** 

Locale Reference.Airport: STL.Airport

State Reference: MO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 11000

**Environment** 

Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: T75.TRACON

Make Model: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1

Function.Controller: Approach Experience.Flight Time.Total: 40

ASRS Report: 458742

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Radar

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

**Events** 

Anomaly. Airspace Violation: Entry

Anomaly. Non Adherence: Published Procedure

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment.Other ATC Equipment : Automation Handoff Configuration

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Other: Problem Reported -- Unresolved

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas: ATC Facility

Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance

I WAS WORKING LOW W SECTOR. 'X' WAS FLASHED FROM ZKC ZECTOR 58 TO ME ('D' SCOPE). IT SHOULD HAVE FLASHED AT 'N' SCOPE - THE ARRIVAL CTLR. ZKC HANDOFFS OFTEN (3 - 4 TIMES PER SHIFT) ARE FLASHED TO THE WRONG POSITION. I WAS TOLD THIS IS A ZKC AUTOMATION PROB. LITTLE SEEMS TO BE GETTING DONE TO CORRECT WHAT COULD BE A DANGEROUS PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED PROB CONTINUES TO EXIST. RPTR'S SUPVR STATED THAT THE PROB EXISTS AT ZKC AND WAS UNABLE TO ASCERTAIN A RESOLUTION TIME FRAME. RPTR STATED THAT ALTERNATE AVENUES FOR RESOLUTION WERE BEING EXPLORED.

#### Synopsis

T75 CTLR OBSERVES INCORRECT CTL POS HDOF FROM ZKC AND PERCEIVES THIS IS AN AUTOMATION PROB.

#### **Time**

Date: 200002 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility: D10.TRACON

State Reference: TX

Altitude.MSL.Single Value: 13000

## Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: D10.TRACON

Make Model: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON: D10.TRACON

Make Model: Commercial Fixed Wing

#### Person / 1

Function.Controller : Departure Experience.Flight Time.Total : 300

ASRS Report: 462369

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory
Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance
Resolutory Action.Other: Readback/Hearback

Consequence.FAA: Investigated

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: ATC Facility

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

WE HAVE HAD PROBS WITH THE RDVS COMS EQUIP EVER SINCE MOVING INTO THE NEW TRACON 3 YEARS AGO. THE PROB I AM DESCRIBING TODAY IS ONLY ONE OF MANY. WE ARE HAVING PROBS WITH RECEIVING 'CLIPPED' XMISSIONS. THERE ARE 2 TYPES OF CLIPPING WE ARE RECEIVING. 1) THE XMISSION CUTS IN AND OUT AS IT IS BEING RECEIVED. 2) THE FIRST PART IS MISSING BUT THE REST IS CLR. I AM INCLUDING 2 FLOPPY DISKS WITH 2 .WAV FILES THAT DEMONSTRATE BOTH TYPES. IN THE WAVE FILE FOR THE FIRST TYPE, THE ACFT WAS AN MD80 LOCATED 10 MI NE OF MY RECEIVER'S ANTENNA AT 13000 FT, IN OTHER WORDS, WELL INSIDE MY RECEPTION AREA. THIS IS A FREQUENT OCCURRENCE, NOT JUST ONE ACFT'S BAD RADIO. IT DOES SEEM MORE PREVALENT IF THE PLT HAS A SOFT VOICE, BUT IT'S NOT LIMITED TO THIS. IN THE SECOND WAVE FILE I ISSUED AN ALT OF 'ONE SEVEN THOUSAND' TO AN ACFT. WHAT YOU WILL HEAR READ BACK IS 'SEVEN THOUSAND,' HOWEVER, THE ACFT CLBED TO 17000 FT. I HAVE CORRECTED PLTS ON THIS UP TO 5 TIMES IN A ROW AND GET THE SAME THING BACK EACH OF THE FIVE TIMES. EVENTUALLY I JUST HAVE TO GIVE UP SINCE ASKING FOR THE PLT TO CORRECT THE READBACK ISN'T SOLVING THE PROB. SINCE THE PLT IS READING BACK CORRECTLY, THEY GET REALLY AGGRAVATED AT HAVING TO KEEP REPEATING THEMSELVES. WHILE NOT THE CAUSE OF THE PROB. THE PROB IS EXACERBATED BY THE PLT'S IMPROPER RADIO TECHNIQUE -- NOT PLACING THE CALL SIGN FIRST. IF THEY WOULD PUT THE CALL SIGN FIRST, I WOULD HEAR '...OMPANY 123' INSTEAD OF 'COMPANY 123.' WHILE STILL NOT CORRECT, THIS WOULD BE TOLERABLE. THERE AREN'T THAT MANY CALL SIGNS THAT ARE SO CLOSE IN THE WAY THEY SOUND THAT THIS WOULD BE A BIG PROB. THE MAIN PROB IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN COMPLAINING FOR 3 YEARS NOW AND THE FAA STILL HASN'T FIXED THIS EQUIP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT WHEN THE NEW TRACON FACILITY WAS OPENED, THE OLD FACILITY INTEGRATED COM SWITCHING SYS (ICSS) WAS REPLACED WITH THE NEW RAPID DATA AND VOICE SWITCHING (RDVS) SYS. THE RPTR STATED FROM DAY ONE, CTLRS HAVE HAD RECEIVER PROBS -- CLIPPED CALL SIGNS. ACFT DO NOT EXPERIENCE ANY CTLR XMISSION PROBS, ONLY CTLRS RECEIVING ACFT XMISSIONS PROCESSED BY RDVS. INITIALLY, CTLR'S HAD RDVS 'CALL FORWARD' MESSAGE INTERRUPTIONS, BUT THE PROB WAS EVENTUALLY CORRECTED BY A NEW PATH TRACING SIGNAL. THE RPTR STATED THAT THE TRACON RDVS HAS THREE XMITTER SITES: ONE AT DFW ARPT AND TWO ON EITHER SIDE OF DFW ARPT. ALL THREE SITES APPEAR TO HAVE THE SAME PROB. THE RPTR STATES THAT A CTLR MAY HAVE 30 TO 40 CLIPPED XMISSIONS A SHIFT, CAUSING MULTIPLE READBACKS TO THE SAME ACFT, WHICH ADDS TO FREQ CONGESTION AND PLT/CTLR AGGRAVATION -- HAVING TO RESPOND TO SO MANY INTERRUPTED XMISSION READBACKS.

#### Synopsis

D10 CTLR CONCERNED WITH A 3 YEAR, RECURRENT RADIO XMITTER INTERRUPT PROB.

#### **Time**

Date : 200002 Day : Thu

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SAV.Airport

State Reference : GA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: SAV.Tower Make Model: Commercial Fixed Wing

## Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local Function.Controller : Radar ASRS Report : 462734

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Critical

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Executed Go Around

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued Advisory

Resolutory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.Other : Multiple Reports Of Go Around

#### **Situations**

Aircraft.Make Model.Value: 998.90

# **Supplementary**Problem Areas: Airport

AGAIN AN ACFT WAS SENT AROUND BECAUSE THE SAVANNAH ARPT COMMISSION REFUSES TO PUT A C3 TXWY SIGN, FOR ACFT LNDG RWY 27. C3 TXWY IS THE FIRST TXWY AVAILABLE FOR LNDG ACFT ON RWY 27. THIS IS ABOUT THE FIFTH TIME AN ACFT WAS SENT AROUND BECAUSE OF THIS UNMARKED TXWY. WHY! WHY!

Synopsis: ATCT RPTR UPSET THAT UNNECESSARY GO AROUNDS DIRECTED AT SAV AS RESULT OF NON EXISTENT TXWY MARKINGS FOR LNDG FLCS.

#### **Time**

Date: 200003 Day: Mon

Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

#### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport

State Reference : NJ

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower: EWR.Tower

Make Model: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

#### Person / 1

Function.Instruction: Instructor
Function.Controller: Combined Local

ASRS Report: 466147

## Person / 2

Function.Instruction: Trainee

Function.Controller: Combined Local

#### Person / 3

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 4

Function.Oversight : Airport Manager Function.Other Personnel : Vehicle Driver

## **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

## **Supplementary**

Problem Areas: ATC Facility

Problem Areas: Navigational Facility

I WAS TRAINING A DEVELOPMENTAL ON LCL. HE CLRED ACR X FOR TKOF. I OBSERVED A VEHICLE XING THE DEPARTURE RWY 04L DOWNFIELD WITHOUT PERMISSION. I CANCELED ACR X TKOF. NO REPLY. I CANCELED TKOF AGAIN. NO REPLY. VEHICLE WAS NOW ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RWY 04L AND ACR X CONTINUED TKOF ROLL. ACR X NEVER HEARD ME IT SEEMED. NEWARK HAS KNOWN ABOUT THIS DEAD SPOT IN XMISSIONS FOR OVER A YEAR. A STATEMENT ON OUR ATIS EVEN ADVISES ACFT TO USE UPPER ANTENNAE. EVERY DAY WE HAVE ACFT, MOSTLY B737, THAT NEVER ACKNOWLEDGE A TKOF CLRNC, BUT ROLL. WE CAN'T HEAR THEM AT TIMES AND THEY CANNOT HEAR US AT TIMES. THIS FREQ PROB CAN SOON LEAD TO MAJOR LOSS OF SEPARATION. I DO NOT KNOW IF AF IS GOING TO EVER FIX THIS PROB OR NOT. WE EVEN LOG IN THE DAILY LOG EVERY ACFT THAT TAKES OFF WITHOUT US EVER HEARING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. I OBSERVED THIS SIT IN TIME TO CANCEL THE ACFT'S TKOF SAFELY, BUT DUE TO THIS EQUIP PROB, I WAS NOT ABLE TO DO MY JOB. LUCKILY THEY MISSED THIS TIME SINCE THE VEHICLE WAS FAR DOWN THE DEPARTURE RWY AND WAS ACROSS THE RWY IN NO TIME (APPROX 7000 FT AWAY). THIS PROB NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED AS SO ON AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THERE IS A MAJOR LOSS OF SEPARATION.

#### Synopsis:

EWR LCL CTLR CLAIMS THERE IS A DEAD SPOT IN TWR RADIO RECEPTION WHEN TFC IS ON AND AROUND RWY 04L. RPTR STATES THIS PROB HAS PERSISTED FOR OVER A YEAR.

#### **Time**

Date: 200003 Day: Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : BTR.Airport

State Reference : LA Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions: VMC

#### Aircraft / 1

Controlling Facilities. Tower: BTR. Tower

Make Model: SF 340b

#### Aircraft / 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower: BTR.Tower Make Model: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

## Person / 1

Function.Controller : Ground Experience.Flight Time.Total : 200

ASRS Report: 466636

#### Person / 2

Function.Oversight : PIC Function.Flight Crew : Captain

#### Person / 3

Function.Flight Crew: Single Pilot

#### **Events**

Anomaly.Incursion: Runway

Anomaly.Conflict: Ground Less Severe Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

## Supplementary

Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

DAILY RWY INCURSIONS AT BTR. DUE TO THE CLOSE PROX OF RWY 4R AND TXWY E, BOTH OF WHICH CROSS RWY 13/31, THERE EXISTS A CONSTANT PROB WITH ACFT LNDG ON RWY 13 AND EXITING OF RWY 4R INSTEAD OF TXWY E. THIS IS DUE TO SEVERAL PROBS. THE FIRST PROB, WHICH IS PROBABLY UNCORRECTABLE, IS THAT THE ELEVATION OF RWY 4R IS HIGHER THAN TXWY E. THIS MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR A PLT TO EASILY SEE THE TXWY FROM GND LVL. THE SECOND PROB, WHICH COULD BE CORRECTED, IS THAT THE ARPT HAS PAINTED A SOLID YELLOW STRIPE ON EACH SIDE OF THE WHITE CTRLINE STRIP OF RWY 4R, ALL THE WAY TO THE EDGE OF RWY 13. ALTHOUGH THIS IS INTENDED TO BE A LEAD IN LINE TXWY B ONTO RWY 4R, IT IS MUCH LONGER THAN IT NEEDS TO BE AND IT LEADS A PLT TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE SEEING THE YELLOW CTRLINE OF A TXWY INSTEAD OF A RWY. ANOTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO ADD WHITE EDGE STRIPING ON RWY 4R UP TO THE INTXN OF RWY 13. RWY 13, BEING AN INSTRUMENT RWY HAS WHITE EDGE MARKINGS, BUT RWY 4R, BEING A SMALL GA RWY HAS NONE. A THIRD POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE THE INSTALLATION OF A SIGN (NEXT TO THE SET OF VASI'S FOR RWY 31) THAT WOULD SAY 'NO TURNS NEXT INTXN.' THE MOST RECENT INCURSION WAS AN SF34 LNDG RWY 13 WHO WAS TOLD TO 'TURN R AT THE SECOND INTXN...TXWY E AND CONTACT GND CTL.' THE SF34 TURNED ON RWY 4R ANYWAY AND A C172 WAS ON SHORT FINAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT RWY 4R IS APPROX 1 FT HIGHER THAN TXWY E. THE TXWY IS NOT IMMEDIATELY VISIBLE AS THE PLT APCHES TXWY E ON RWY 13. THE RPTR BELIEVES HIS SUGGESTIONS WOULD REDUCE RECURRENT RWY INCURSIONS OF PLTS TURNING R ONTO RWY 4R INSTEAD OF TXWY E.

#### Synopsis

CTLR CONCERNED WITH BTR TXWY DESIGN AND SIGNAGE, WHICH APPEARS TO CONTRIBUTE TO RWY INCURSIONS.

## **Time**

Date : 200003 Day : Tue

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

Locale Reference.Airport : TUL.Airport

State Reference : OK Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 466952

Person / 2

Function.Controller: Ground

Person / 3

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

**Events** 

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 1

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Supplementary

Problem Areas : Airport Problem Areas : ATC Facility

Problem Areas: FAA

RECENTLY A NEW PROC OF HAVING EMER EQUIP RESPOND TO STANDBY POS ON THE TWR CTLR'S FREQ INSTEAD OF THE GND CTLR'S FREQ WAS IMPLEMENTED AS A TEST, REPORTEDLY NATIONWIDE. THIS TEST HAS NOW BEEN ASKED TO BE EXTENDED TO JUNE 2000. THIS CAUSES A VERY UNSAFE CONDITION. THE REASON FOR THE TEST IS SO EMER VEHICLES CAN TALK TO THE ACFT IF NECESSARY. IT IS OUR JOB TO TALK TO ACFT ON OUR FREQS. VEHICLES COULD VERY EASILY BLOCK OUR FREQ WHEN NEEDED TO TALK TO OTHER ACFT NOT INVOLVED. THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF TWR CTLR (LCL CTLR) IS TO TALK TO ACFT ON ACTIVE RWYS. IT IS THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF A GND CTLR TO TALK TO ACFT AND VEHICLES ON TXWYS AND MOVEMENT AREAS. A SIT COULD OCCUR WHERE 10 TO 20 PLANES COULD BE TAXIING ON GND FREQ, WHILE EMER VEHICLES ARE RESPONDING IN BETWEEN ON TWR FREQ. THIS REQUIRES THE TWR CTLR TO DIVERT HIS ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE RWYS TO ATTEND TO VEHICLES ON GND CTLR'S TXWYS. THIS TEST SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN APPROVED TO START WITH, NO LESS BE EXTENDED. THE VEHICLES SHOULD RESPOND ON GND FREQ AND WHEN REACHING THEIR STANDBY POS CAN SWITCH TO TWR. RECENTLY 2 EMER RESPONSES FOUND THAT AFTER THE EMER ACFT LANDED AND CLED THE RWYS, THE PLT SWITCHED TO GND CTL. NOW THE EMER VEHICLES WERE ON THE WRONG FREQ. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE EMER EQUIP TEST PROC WAS CANCELLED ON APR/XA/00. HE SAID THEY WOULD REVERT TO THE OLD PROCS AND TRY TO IMPROVE ON THEM. THE TWR MANAGER WAS IN THE CAB ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN AN EMER WAS IN PROGRESS AND APPARENTLY WAS NOT PLEASED WITH THE OP. A DEDICATED CTL POS ON A SEPARATE FREQ WAS SUGGESTED, BUT FUNDING AND STAFFING IS NOT AVAILABLE.

#### Synopsis

ATCT CTLR AT TUL IS CONCERNED ABOUT AN FAA NATIONWIDE TEST TO PUT A PLT WITH AN EMER ON THE SAME FREQ WITH EMER VEHICLES.

## **Time**

Date : 200004 Day : Mon

Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

**Place** 

Locale Reference.Airport : CPS.Airport

State Reference: IL

Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Person / 1

Function.Controller : Local ASRS Report : 469733

**Events** 

Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

**Supplementary**Problem Areas: Airport

Problem Areas: Environmental Factor

TREES IN THE VISUAL PATH BETWEEN THE TWR AND RWY 30L CONTINUE TO GROW INTO AND ABOVE THE LINE OF SIGHT OF THE TWR TO SEE ACFT ON BASE AND FINAL. FURTHERMORE, TREES IN THE LINE OF SIGHT FOR RWY 04 FINAL ARE DOING THE SAME. BECOMING A CRITICAL SAFETY ISSUE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE TREES SIT HAS EXISTED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND GETS WORSE EVERY YEAR. CTLRS CANNOT SEE TFC BELOW 800 FT TO ALMOST THE THRESHOLD. CPS TWR DOES HAVE A BRITE RADAR SLAVED FROM STL ABOUT 10 MI AWAY. MOSTLY PRIVATE PROPERTY AROUND THE ARPT AND OWNERS ARE NOT VERY COOPERATIVE.

#### Synopsis

ATCT CTLR AT CPS CLAIMS TREES OBSTRUCT CTLR'S VIEW OF TFC ON BASE AND FINAL LNDG RWY 30L AND RWY 04.